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Abstract
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes are becoming evermore prevalent in the
cryptography domain. They allow computation on encrypted data without the necessity
of decryption, thus opening a plethora of new applications relating to cloud computing
and cryptography.
FHE schemes have been viewed generally as being impractical in a real-world scenario,
thus leading to a relatively slow uptake within industry despite the high level of interest
in the topic. This has caused a lack of FHE applications and thus various practical
questions have not been tackled due to such problems not arising or going unnoticed
within research.
This thesis explores three contrasting FHE applications, each of which contain new ideas
and overcome challenges within FHE. Namely, we analyse applications that require sig-
nificant levels of bootstrapping, alternative data representations as well as the possibility
of using FHE in the anonymity domain. Proofs of concept have been developed for each
application to display the feasibility of each idea.
The aim of this research is to present the mathematics of FHE in a comprehensive
manner to improve the accessibility of concepts within FHE. Furthermore we analyse
the usability and versatility of FHE in various scenarios with the aim to demonstrate
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Throughout history, the security of the transmission and storage of data has always been
an issue of high importance. Numerous cryptographic schemes have been developed to
accommodate this need for information security. However due to the ever increasing
prominence of cloud computing, merely the process of encrypting data is no longer
sufficient. Encrypting data provides a means of securely storing and transmitting data
to trusted parties. Yet what if the intended recipient of the data is not trusted by the
sender? In the general case of communication this may not be the case but there are
numerous scenarios where the user will not want to reveal their data to other parties but
require them to have access. An example of a common use case is when the user wants
to outsource computations on sensitive data.
1.1 Background of HE
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) schemes allow for computations to be performed directly
on ciphertexts without the need for decryption. This allows users to outsource compu-
tations to the cloud without revealing their data. Achieving such a scheme that can
evaluate useful circuit depths has been an open problem for numerous years [69]. Since
then numerous different types of HE schemes have been proposed by the cryptographic
1
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community. Among them are the Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) schemes
that only allow limited types of homomorphic operations, namely addition but not mul-
tiplication or vice versa.
The community began to look at lattice based cryptography to perform HE and it
was not until Gentry’s breakthrough in 2009 [39] that Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) schemes were shown to be possible. FHE schemes, unlike partially homomorphic
schemes, allow for arbitrary computations on encrypted data. Gentry [39] presented
a scheme that was Somewhat Homomorphic (SWHE) that through a novel technique
called “bootstrapping” could evaluate its own decryption circuit in addition to a NAND
gate to construct a Fully Homomorphic scheme.
Currently there are public-key encryption schemes that rely on the factorisation of
prime numbers for their security, namely RSA [70]. Since the formulation of Shor’s algo-
rithm [71], which presents an algorithm that can factorise an integer N in polynomial
time using a quantum computer. Prior to this discovery there has been increased inter-
ested in developing quantum secure cryptographic schemes. A previously well-studied
set of problems that was explored was lattice problems, thus leading to lattice based
cryptography.
1.1.1 BGV Scheme
The scheme proposed in 2012 by Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [13], known as
the BGV scheme, was one of the more prominent FHE schemes. It was an extension
upon Gentry’s original scheme that mitigated the need for bootstrapping through the
introduction of a concept called “levels”.
Rather than building a scheme that is required to perform the computationally expen-
sive bootstrapping technique, the BGV scheme produces a ciphertext that has an arbi-
trary number of pre-computed “computation levels”. As operations are performed upon
the ciphertext levels are consumed until the ciphertext reaches the base level and no
further computations can be performed.
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This scheme produced considerable gains in the efficiency of FHE thus improving the
practicality of using such schemes. Theoretically, one can build a scheme with infinitely
many levels although this is infeasible in practice thus technically making the BGV
scheme a Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE) scheme in practice.
In later implementations of the scheme [46] would utilise both the “leveled” scheme
with the inclusion of Gentry’s bootstrapping technique. This allows a user to evaluate
circuits using the more efficient leveled scheme until the ciphertext reaches the base level
and then use the bootstrapping technique to “refresh” the ciphertext back to the top
level before performing additional operations. The BGV scheme is described later in the
thesis in Section 2.
1.2 The Current State-of-Art
Research and development on FHE schemes is ongoing in both academia and industry.
Particular organisations of note are Microsoft Research and IBM Research who have
developed the homomorphic encryption libraries S.E.A.L. [18] and HElib [46] respec-
tively. In addition to this, other notable encryption libraries that implement FHE are
PALISADE [66] and Fast Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus (TFHE) [24].
Despite the various available FHE libraries, currently the libraries are not mature
enough for practical use within the real world in a commercial environment. This further
enforces the overall impracticality of FHE schemes however as improvements in hardware,
algorithm efficiency and implementational techniques continue, practical uses of FHE
have been shown and the feasibility of FHE schemes will continue to grow.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 2 covers the history of FHE from the initial statement of the open problem,
to Gentry’s breakthrough thesis through to the current stage of FHE research.
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Chapter 3 provides an in-depth description of the mathematics behind FHE schemes,
providing a detailed breakdown of how FHE schemes work mathematically.
Chapter 4 describes an anonymous routing algorithm implemented using an open-
source homomorphic encryption library that protects against global adversaries.
Chapter 5 presents a method for representing and computing on rational numbers
within FHE.
Chapter 6 proposes an FHE algorithm that performs logistic regression homomor-
phically.
Chapter 7 presents the conclusion and some thoughts for future work.
Chapter 2
History of FHE
This chapter provides an extensive literature review of the history of how homomorphic
encryption schemes developed over time and aims to describe the differing types of FHE
schemes that have emerged.
2.1 Before FHE
The ability to perform computations on encrypted data without the need to decrypt it
has been an interesting open problem for a long time since its first mention by Rivest et al.
[68]. Prior to the development of fully homomorphic encryption schemes, there existed
encryption schemes that allowed the computation of only certain types of operations
directly on the ciphertext itself. These schemes were known as partially homomorphic
encryption schemes (PHE) which will be described in this section.
2.1.1 RSA
The Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) scheme [70] is one of the first public-key cryptosys-
tems and is the earliest known encryption scheme capable of homomorphic computations.
This scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic, although is not additively homomorphic.
However, textbook RSA is deterministic and thus is not used in practice due to it being
5
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insecure. In other words, there is no element of randomness during the encryption of
plaintexts under textbook RSA resulting in multiple encryptions of the same plaintext
message yielding identical ciphertexts.
Below is a description of the multiplicatively homomorphic property of textbook RSA:
Definition 2.1.1 (Rivest-Shamir-Adelman). Given two randomly generated primes r
and s, generate a public key (q, e) where q = rs,gcd(e, φ(q)) = 1 and φ(q) = (r−1)(s−1).
The secret key is d = e−1(mod φ(q)). Given a message m, encryption of the message
produces ciphertext c = me(mod q). To decrypt, the ciphertext is raised to the power
of the secret key cd(mod q) = (me)e
−1 = m. Multiplying two ciphertexts c1 and c2
encrypting m1 and m2 respectively, produces the encryption of m1 ·m2.
In order to improve the security of RSA, randomised padding is introduced prior to
the encryption of the message. Therefore we are encrypting p(m) for random padding
function p instead of just encrypting m. Unfortunately, this removes the homomorphic
properties of padded-RSA as we have E(p(m1) · p(m2)) 6= E(p(m1)) · E(p(m2)).
2.1.2 El Gamal
The El Gamal cryptosystem [37] is another multiplicatively homomorphic public-key
cryptosystem which is based upon the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange. The security
of this scheme is reliant on the hardness of discrete logarithm problem, more specifically
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption:
Definition 2.1.2 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman). Given a group G with generator g, dis-
tinguishing between the distributions 〈gx, gy, gxy〉 and 〈gx, gy, gz〉 is known to be hard,
where x, y and z are randomly chosen integers in G.
Given this definition we can now define the El Gamal cryptosystem as follows:
Definition 2.1.3 (El Gamal). Let g be a generator of the cyclic group G with order q.
Choose a random element s ∈ Zq as the secret key and generate the public key h = gs.
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To encrypt the message m ∈ G, we define the ciphertext (c1, c2) where c1 = gu and c2 =
mhu, where u ∈ Zq is chosen randomly. To decrypt the ciphertext, compute m = c2 ·c−s1 .
Multiplying two ciphertexts c1 = (g
u1 ,m1h
u1) and c2 = (g
u2 ,m2h
u2) component-wise to
produce c3 = (g
u1+u2 ,m1m2h
u1+u2) is a valid encryption of the message m1m2.
It is noted that although standard El Gamal only supports multiplicative homomor-
phisms it can be modified to become additively homomorphic, this variant sometimes
being known as exponential El Gamal. This additively homomorphic variant has been
used in electronic voting systems[30] and is preferred over the use of the Paillier cryp-
tosystem when handling messages of “small” size.
The construction of the exponential El Gamal encryption scheme is based on alter-
ing the message space to Zq with addition modulo the prime q as a group operation.
In contrast to using the standard message space Gq with multiplication as its group
operation as used in regular El Gamal. This is achieved by encrypting messages m as
exponents, in other words, the messages that are to be encrypted are of the form gm
for group generator g ∈ Gq. This produces the necessary additive homomorphism for
we have gm1 · gm2 = gm1+m2 as required. However, encrypting messages of this form
increases the complexity of the decryption procedure as it requires the computation of
the discrete log, which is notably a difficult problem. Therefore exponential El Gamal
is only used for “small” messages where the discrete log can be computed efficiently
using either a lookup table or algorithmically. Otherwise if one was looking to use an
additively homomorphic encryption scheme that supported messages of arbitrary length
efficiently, they would consider using the following encryption scheme.
2.1.3 Paillier
Paillier introduced an additively homomorphic encryption scheme [64] that is used for
electronic voting systems for homomorphically counting votes. The security of this
scheme is based upon the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA):
Definition 2.1.4 (Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption). Given a composite
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integer q and x ∈ Zq2 it is hard to find y ∈ Zq2 such that x ≡ yq(mod q2).
Subsequently we can define the Paillier cryptosystem as follows:
Definition 2.1.5 (Paillier). Two prime numbers r, s are chosen at random to generate
the public key q = rs. From this the secret key is defined as the tuple (λ, µ) where
λ = LCM(r − 1, s − 1) and µ = λ−1(mod q). Encrypting a plaintext message m ∈ Zq
produces the ciphertext c = (1 + q)muq(mod q2) where u ∈ Z∗q .
The Paillier cryptosystem is only additively homomorphic as there is no known
method for multiplying two given ciphertexts encrypted under the same Paillier encryp-
tion without knowing the secret key. However it is possible to multiply an encrypted
plaintext E(m1) with an ordinary plaintext m2 via exponentiation E(m1)
m2 . We obtain
D(E(m1)
m2 mod n2) = m1 ·m2.
2.2 The Birth of FHE
Having seen various partially homomorphic encryption schemes based on group homo-
morphisms, the subsequent natural step was to develop fully homomorphic encryption
schemes. It must be noted that before the breakthrough in 2009 there were previous
attempts at proposing such schemes.
The most notable of these is the work of Boneh et al. [6]. This homomorphic, public
key encryption scheme is based upon finite groups which support a bilinear map. It is
additively homomorphic via the use of a construction based upon the Paillier cryptosys-
tem but allows a single multiplication operation via the bilinear map.
The main idea behind this scheme is we have two finite multiplicative cyclic groups
G and G1 and a bilinear map e : G × G → G1. Thus for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z
we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab. Therefore given two ciphertexts c1 := g
m1hr1 ∈ G and
c2 := g
m2hr2 ∈ G we set the ciphertext c := e(c1, c2)hr1 ∈ G1. Resulting in the ciphertext
c = gm1m21 h
r̃
1 ∈ G1. Since the groups G and G1 are additively homomorphic, an arbitrary
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number of additions can be performed followed by a single multiplication that can then
be succeeded by arbitrarily more additions.
Prior to the following subsection, it is useful to note the difference between a some-
what homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme and a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
An encryption scheme is known as fully homomorphic if it can evaluate a binary arith-
metic circuit of unbounded size and depth. An encryption scheme is known as somewhat
homomorphic if it can evaluate a non-empty set of binary arithmetic circuits of limited
size and depth.
2.2.1 Gentry’s Breakthrough
It was not until 2009 that a breakthrough into fully homomorphic encryption was made in
Gentry’s thesis [39]. The work proposed building a somewhat homomorphic encryption
(SHE) scheme from ideal lattices.
Given a plaintext element which exists within an ideal, the encryption of this element
alters the plaintext to another element within the ideal such that it is infeasible to
compute the nearest ideal element to the ciphertext without having access the secret key
to remove the alteration. To ensure that the scheme is circularly secure the encryption
procedure must be non-deterministic so that multiple encryptions of the same plaintext
produce different ciphertexts. This is achieved by adding a small “error” or “noise”
element that is chosen at random.
This “noise” element is removed during the decryption procedure, however the noise
is only removed correctly if it is “small”. This is due the addition and multiplication
operations not only affecting the original plaintext element but the noise element as well.
Each operation has the affect of moving the ciphertext further away from the original
ideal element as the noise grows in size. This continues to happen until the decryption
algorithm incorrectly removes the noise as it erroneously correlates the ciphertext to
another element in the ideal.
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Subsequently the number of operations that can be performed on a single cipher-
text is limited by the growth of the noise variable. The problem was trying to make
this somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme into one that is fully homomorphic, in
other words a scheme that allowed an unbounded number of operations to be performed
without the requiring the secret key.
Gentry proposed a solution known as bootstrapping, which was a technique of con-
necting a succession of SHE schemes together an arbitrary number of times to form a
fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Computations are specified as arithmetic circuits
within FHE schemes and the decryption procedure can also be represented as such. The
concept of bootstrapping is a FHE cryptosystem that can homomorphically evaluate its
own decryption circuit. This insinuates that if one can create an SHE scheme that can
evaluate its own decryption circuit followed by at least one NAND gate then they would
obtain an FHE scheme.
The decryption circuit has two input gates, one that accepts a ciphertext and the
other accepting a secret decryption key, which outputs a single plaintext message. The
general idea to homomorphically evaluate this circuit involves providing an encryption
of the secret key to the circuit along with the ciphertext that you want to refresh the
noise level for. This produces another ciphertext encrypting the same plaintext message
under the same public key, except the noise level is at the level of a freshly encrypted
ciphertext. Thus further operations can be computed without removing the correctness
of decryption. In theory this bootstrapping technique can be computed arbitrarily many
times thus producing an FHE scheme. However this is a computationally expensive
procedure and has led to cryptographers searching for an alternative method to boot-
strapping for managing the noise levels. A variant of this bootstrapping method will be
described in more detail in Chapter 3.
Gentry’s scheme was one of the first of many schemes to begin using lattice based
cryptography which relied on a known mathematical problem known as the learning
with errors (LWE) problem [67] which will be introduced formally later in this thesis in
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section 3.2. This lattice problem also forms the basis of the security for the next three
schemes described in this chapter.
Ultimately Gentry’s breakthrough led to considerable developments on lattice based
fully homomorphic encryption schemes as described in the following subsections.
2.2.2 The BGV Scheme
Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [13], after which the scheme is named, produced
an alternative method of noise management that mitigated the need for Gentry’s expen-
sive bootstrapping method. The scheme utilised two new techniques, key-switching and
modulus switching introduced by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [15, 16]. Key-switching
allows the user to reduce the dimension of the ciphertext and modulus switching is used
to decrease the magnitude of the noise element. Thus using these techniques mitigates
the need for Gentry’s bootstrapping method as well as the requirement to “squash” the
decryption circuit in order to reduce its circuit complexity.
These innovative techniques produced what are known as leveled fully homomor-
phic encryption schemes. Briefly, the scheme contains a chain of moduli relative to a
ciphertext, the number of moduli in the chain corresponds to the number of levels in the
scheme. Given a ciphertext c ∈ Rq that is an element of a modulo ring Rq for modulus
q, one can convert the ciphertext into c′ ∈ R′q where q′ < q, such that c and c′ encrypt
the same plaintext message but relative to a different ciphertext modulus. The key dif-
ference between the two ciphertexts is the noise level has been approximately reduced
by a factor of qq′ . This scheme will be described in more detail in Chapter 3.
2.2.3 The FV Scheme
Following the work of Brakerski [12], Fan and Vercauteren [38] developed an FHE scheme
that is similar to the BGV scheme conceptually. The scheme differs from the previously
described BGV scheme in that it obtains high levels of security through the introduction
of additional “noise” elements thus allowing for the use of smaller parameters and thus
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a smaller algebra. The benefit of this is utilising a smaller algebra for the homomorphic
operations increases the speed of the processes without sacrificing the level of security.
Fan and Vercauteren achieve this by introducing a scaling factor that is present within










where p is the plaintext prime and p/q is the scaling factor. The idea for preventing the
scaling factor from affecting the correctness of the decryption procedure is to multiply
the message polynomial by a large factor in order to make to the scale negligible and
easily removed through rounding. This FHE variant results in slower noise growth.
2.2.4 The GSW Scheme
Gentry et al. [41] proposed an alternative LWE-based FHE scheme that made the
homomorphic operations easier to compute. Previous schemes relied on key-switching in
order to reduce the dimension of the ciphertext after each homomorphic multiplication
because in previous schemes multiplication is the tensor product of two ciphertexts.
The GSW scheme proposed a FHE scheme where the plaintext messages are inte-
gers instead of polynomials and the data is encrypted into matrices as opposed to vec-
tors as in the BGV scheme. This mitigates the need for both modulus switching and
key-switching as a result, which although creates a conceptually simpler FHE scheme
arguably decreases the efficiency as opposed to previous FHE schemes as additions and
multiplications are now performed using matrix additions and multiplications.
Khedr et al. [54] ported the GSW scheme to the RWLE setting in order to improve
the scheme’s efficiency. However the scheme continues to have a higher complexity than
previous schemes.
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2.2.5 Non-LWE-Based FHE Schemes
In addition to the LWE-based schemes that have been described previously, Gentry’s
framework for building an SHE scheme that can evaluate its own decryption circuit
homomorphically was explored using alternative cryptosystems. Two of note are AGCD
and NTRU-based [49] schemes.
Such a scheme of note is the one proposed by van Dijk et al. [32]. Using Gentry’s
framework [39], van Dijk et al. made it conceptually simpler by reducing the security
problem of their scheme from the LWE problem to the Approximate Greatest Common
Divisor (AGCD) problem. As a result of this the homomorphic operations are performed
on integers rather than operations on ring elements in the LWE-based scheme. However
to ensure a practical level of security within this scheme the size of the public key is
O(λ10) for security parameter λ which is too large for practical purposes.
It is also noted that NTRU-based HE schemes are conceptually similar to LWE-
based schemes however ciphertexts can be represented using a single polynomial element
as opposed to the two polynomial elements required to represent ciphertexts in LWE-
based schemes. This allows for faster homomorphic operations although the noise growth
rate is considerably higher in NTRU-based schemes as shown by Lepoint and Naehrig
[57].
2.3 Summary
As it has been presented in this section, the concept of achieving a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme had been an open problem first mentioned in 1978 [68]. It was
not until the 2009 breakthrough by Gentry [39] that such a scheme was first shown
to be achievable. Although lacking in practical efficiency the concept of building a
SHE scheme that can evaluate its own decryption circuit was further explored using the
various cryptosystems LWE, AGCD and NTRU. This eventually led to new techniques
being proposed that improved the overall efficiency of FHE schemes such as modulus
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switching and key-switching.
Gentry’s work has led to numerous FHE variants that have in turn produced imple-
mentations such as HElib [48] which is based on the BGV scheme [14] and S.E.A.L.
[18] which is based on the FV scheme [38] as well as TFHE [24] which is based on the
GSW scheme [41]. In addition to this there is an encryption library called PALISADE




This chapter will introduce important mathematical concepts that will be referenced
throughout the duration of the thesis. We begin with a brief introduction to the concept
of algebraic lattices and rings which are integral to the learning with errors problem.
Naturally this leads into a description of the mathematical problem with which the FHE
schemes used in this thesis are based upon. Finally, the remaining chapters of this
thesis describe applications that are based upon a BGV variant of FHE. Due to this an
introduction and detailed description of the BGV scheme will be provided in section 3.3,
along with descriptions of the algorithms which make up the scheme.
3.1 Introduction To Lattices and Rings
This section will introduce the theoretical concepts on which the LWE-based schemes
are based upon.
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defined by all integral linear combinations of n linearly independent vectors ~b1, ...,~bn ∈
Rm for m ≥ n. The set of vectors ~b1, ...,~bn, or lattice basis can also be represented as a
matrix
B = [b1, ..., bn] ∈ Rm×n (3.2)
where each basis vector is a column of the matrix. Thus equation 3.1 can be rewritten
using matrix notation as L(B) = {Bx : x ∈ Zn} where Bx is a matrix-vector multiplica-
tion. The integers m and n are called the dimension and rank of the lattice respectively.
Recall that a ring R is a set of elements with two binary operations, addition and
multiplication. We define an ideal as follows
Definition 3.1.1. Given a ring R, the ideal I is a subset of R that forms an additive
group and is a left ideal if for all a ∈ I and r ∈ R there exists ra ∈ I. Likewise a I is a
right ideal if for all a ∈ I and r ∈ R there exists ar ∈ I. A two-sided ideal is an ideal
that is both a left and right ideal.
We consider two-sided ideals and refer to these as simply ideals. The rings we use in
this thesis are quotient rings defined below.
Definition 3.1.2. Given a ring R and a two-sided ideal I, the quotient ring of R mod I
is the group of cosets R/I with the operations of coset addition and coset multiplication.
We will be mostly working with integer polynomial rings of the formR = Z[X]/(Φm(X))
where Φm(X) is the m’th cyclotomic polynomial. Furthermore the quotient ring Rp =
R/pR is the ring of integer polynomials modulo p ∈ Z.
3.2 The Learning with Errors Problem
Cryptographic schemes are commonly based upon hard mathematical problems in terms
of security. Examples of these types of problems would be the discrete logarithm problem
and integer factorisation, both of which will be described in the following section. The
security of fully homomorphic encryption is similarly based upon the hardness of a
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mathematical problem, namely, the learning with errors (LWE) problem [67] which will
now be introduced.
Prior to introducing the mathematical problems of which the security of FHE schemes
are based upon, we introduce the inner product, also known as the dot product or scalar
product, between two vectors
Definition 3.2.1 (Inner product). Given two vectors ~a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) and ~b =




aibi = a1b1 + a2b2 + · · ·+ anbn
where n denotes the dimension of the vector space. Note that the dimension of the two
vectors must always be equal.
For the duration of this thesis we denote the inner product of two vectors ~a and ~b as
〈~a,~b〉.
The LWE problem is based on the “learning from parity with error” problem defined
as follows:
Definition 3.2.2 (Learning from parity with error). Given a system of equations with
“errors”
〈s, a1〉 ≈ε b1(mod 2)
〈s, a2〉 ≈ε b2(mod 2)
...
where the ai’s are chosen independently from a uniform distribution over Zn2 . The
problem is finding the value of s ∈ Zn2 when the bi’s are correct with probability 1 − ε
for integer n ≥ 1 and real number 1 ≥ ε ≥ 0.
Note that when ε = 0 the problem is trivial to solve via Gaussian elimination. This
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is the standard “learning from parity” problem. Blum et al. [5] contributed the current
best known sub-exponential algorithm for solving the LWE problem.
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is an extension of the learning from parity
with error problem defined above. The LWE problem introduced by Regev [67] is defined
as follows:
Definition 3.2.3 (LWE). For security parameter λ, let n = n(λ) be an integer dimen-
sion, let q = q(λ) ≤ 2 be an integer, and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over Z. The
LWEn,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distribution: In the first distri-
bution, one samples (~ai, bi) uniformly from Zn+1q . In the second distribution, one first
draws ~s ← Znq uniformly and then samples (~ai, bi) ∈ Zn+1q by sampling ~ai ← Znq uni-
formly, ei ← χ, and setting bi = 〈~a,~s〉 + ei. The LWEn,q,χ assumption is that the
LWEn,q,χ problem is infeasible.
It was proven by Regev [67] that for specific Gaussian error distributions χ and
moduli q that the LWEn,q,χ assumption is true if and only if certain worst-case lattive
problems are hard to solve using a quantum algorithm.
Brakerski et al. [14] state a definition of Regev’s result using B-bounded distributions,
which is a distribution over the integers where the magnitude of a sample is bounded
with high probability. Before presenting the definition for B-bounded distributions, we
introduce the definition of a negligible function
Definition 3.2.4 (Negligible function). A function µ is negligible if and only if for all
c ∈ N, there exists n0 ∈ N, such that for all n ≥ n0, we have µ(n) ≥ n−c.
Using definition 3.2.4 we can now define B-bounded distributions
Definition 3.2.5 (B-bounded distributions). A distribution sample {χn}n∈N supported
over the integers, is called B-bounded if
e
Pr← χn[|e| > B] = negl(n),
Chapter 3. Mathematics of FHE 19
where negl(n) is a negligible function.
Regev [67] presented a worst-case to average-case reduction for the LWE problem
which is captured in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Regev [67]). For any integer dimension n, prime integer q = q(n), and
B = B(n) ≥ 2n, there is a B-bounded distribution χ that can be efficiently sampled such
that if there exists an efficient (possibly quantum) algorithm that solves LWEn,q,χ, then
there is an efficient quantum algorithm for solving Õ(qn1.5/B)-approximate worst-case
SIVP.
Recall the definition of the known lattice problem,
Definition 3.2.6 (Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP)). Given a lattice L




for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 1 shows that LWE is as hard as the well known lattice problem SIVP. This
problem was subsequently extended to a ring variant known as the ring learning with
errors.
3.2.1 The Ring Learning with Errors Problem
First introduced by Lyubashevsky et al. [60], the ring learning with errors (RLWE)
problem is defined as follows
Definition 3.2.7 (RLWE). For security parameter λ, let f(x) = xd+1 where d = d(λ) is
a power of 2. Let q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer. Let R = Z[x]/(f(x)) and let Rq = R/(qR).
Let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The RLWEd,q,χ problem is to distinguish the
following two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from
R2q . In the second distribution, one first draws s ← Rq uniformly and then samples
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(ai, bi) ∈ R2q by sampling ai ← Rq uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi = ai · s + ei. The
RLWEd,q,χ assumption is that the RLWEd,q,χ problem is infeasible.
The RLWE problem is known to be hard as the extensively studied shortest vector
problem (SVP) over ideal lattices can be reduced to it [60]. The shortest vector problem
is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.8 (SVP). Given a basis B ∈ Zm×n, find a non-zero lattice vector Bx for
x ∈ Zn\{0} such that ‖Bx‖ ≤ ‖By‖ for all y ∈ Zn\{0}.
This problem has been shown to be NP-hard [62], thus making the RLWE problem
to be at least NP-hard.
3.2.2 The General Learning with Errors Problem
Brakerski et al. [14] noticed that the LWE and RLWE problems were identical syntacti-
cally, aside from using difference rings and different vector dimensions. This led to their
definition of the general learning with errors (GLWE) problem
Definition 3.2.9 (GLWE). Let n,m, q ∈ Z; let R = Z[X]/(Φm(X)), Rq = R/(qR); and
let χ be a distribution over R. Given arbitrarily many samples (~x, yi) ∈ Rn+1q , where
yi = 〈~xi, ~s〉+ ei, with ~xi, ~s← Rnq sampled uniformly and ei ← χ, find ~s.
The specific LWE variant of the GLWE problem is when m = 1 in definition 3.2.9. In
other words R is the ring of integers Z. The ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem
uses a polynomial ring m ≥ 1 as opposed using Z and the dimension is different, namely
n = 1 in definition 3.2.9 for the RLWE case.
Using the GLWE problem, Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [14] defined an
FHE scheme known as the BGV scheme, named after the authors.
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3.3 The BGV Scheme
The BGV scheme [14] is based upon the GLWE problem and is the scheme which the
remaining sections of the thesis will be based upon. This section discusses the algorith-
mic overview of the BGV scheme followed by a more in-depth description of the two
techniques that were introduced to replace Gentry’s bootstrapping algorithm.
Given a polynomial ring modulo a cyclotomic polynomial A = Z[X]/(Φm(X)) we
define the plaintext space Ap = A/pA to the polynomial ring modulo plaintext prime
p. In addition to this, the corresponding ciphertext space is defined to be Aq = A/(qA)
where q  p for odd modulus q. Since all FHE data is contained within polynomial
rings, plaintext messages need to be encoded into polynomials m ∈ Ap before they are
encrypted into ciphertext polynomials c ∈ Aq.
The BGV scheme is a public key encryption scheme comprising of the following main
algorithms:
• Setup(λ, L): Given a security parameter λ and the number of levels L, generates
a ladder of decreasing moduli from qL to q0 of size (L + 1) · µ bits and µ bits
respectively. The parameter µ is chosen alongside other parameters to ensure
the scheme is based on a General Learning With Errors (GLWE) instance which
provides 2λ bit security against known attacks. Let the ring A = Z[x]/(xd + 1)
and let the set paramsj = (qj , dj , nj , Nj , χj) be the set of parameters defining the
scheme at a specific level 0 ≤ j < L. Thus this routine generates L parameter sets.
• KeyGen(params): Given the security parameter λ, generates the public encryption
key pk and a corresponding secret decryption key sk.
• Encrypt(m, pk): Given a plaintext message m and public key pk, encrypts the
message into a ciphertext c.
• Decrypt(c, sk): Given a valid ciphertext c and a secret key sk, decrypts the cipher-
text to obtain the plaintext message m.
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A mathematical description of these algorithms will be provided in the following sub-
sections. Note that the above list of algorithms describes a plain GLWE-based encryp-
tion scheme without homomorphic operations. The following detailed descriptions will
be followed with a description of the homomorphic additions and multiplications. Finally
the section will be concluded with a description of the two novel techniques that were
introduced to the BGV scheme to mitigate Gentry’s bootstrapping operation, namely
modulus switching and key-switching.
3.3.1 Setup
This section provides a description of the setup phase of the BGV scheme given a security
parameter λ, representing 2λ security against known attacks. This value is typically
chosen to be λ = 100 [14].
Firstly we determine if we are setting parameters for a LWE-based scheme or a
RLWE-based scheme. Recall from the description of the GLWE problem 3.2.9 that
LWE is GLWE with d = 1 which defines the ring A = Z[X]/(x+ 1) = Z. Alternatively,
the RLWE problem is GLWE with n = 1 which defines the vector dimensions over the
polynomial ring An. Note that when selecting a RLWE-based scheme, the degree d of
the polynomial xd + 1 is chosen to be a power of 2.
To create the scheme we select the vector dimension n, an odd modulus q, a noise
distribution χ over the ring A, which is typically chosen to be a Gaussian distribution,
and N = d(2n+ 1) log qe. Note, given a ciphertext space Aq = A/qA we can assume the
plaintext space is A2 = A/2A for simplicity. However larger plaintext spaces are possible
of the form Ap = A/pA for prime number p where p q.
It must be noted that the noise distribution χ is chosen to be as small as possible. The
reason for this will become clearer after the introduction of homomorphic operations to
the scheme which will be described in subsequent subsections. As mentioned in [14, p.8],
to achieve 2λ security against known lattice attacks, one must have n·d = Ω(λ·log(q/B))
where B is the bound on the length of the noise.
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Thus, prior to the setup phase, we should obtain a set of parameters params =
(q, d, n,N, χ) defining the scheme that shall be used. However, looking back at the defi-
nition of Setup(λ, L) notice that there are multiple of levels L and the set of parameters,
paramsj , define the ladder of decreasing moduli from qL to q0. It is noted that the
ring dimension dj and noise distribution χj are independent of L and can be denoted as
d = dL and χ = χL respectively. The vector dimension nj may depend on the circuit
level.
3.3.2 Key generation
Following the description provided in [14, p.11], we proceed to provide a description of
the generation of both the secret and public keys of an FHE scheme. Given the set of
parameters paramsj we create a secret ~sj ∈ An+1q and public counterpart Aj ∈ An+1×1q
for each circuit level 0 ≤ j ≤ L that make up the secret key sk and public key pk
respectively.
More specifically, the secret key sk is a collection of randomly chosen vectors ~sj
where each ~s ← (1, s′1, s′2, . . . , s′n) ∈ An+1q and each s′ ← χn. Namely, each s′ is an
n-dimensional vector chosen randomly from a Gaussian distribution χ. For simplicity
we shall denote the secret key element ~sj = (1, s
′) where s′ ∈ Anq .
Using the previously generated secret key sk and the set of parameters paramsj we
generate a uniform matrix A′ ← AN×nq and choose an N -dimensional “noise” vector
~e ← χN . We then set ~b ← A′s′ + 2~e. Now we can define our public key as the (n + 1)-
column matrix consisting of ~b followed by the n columns of −A′. Thus our public key
is the collection of A′js. Note prior to the key generation steps we can now perform the
operation A·~s = 2e, which is an important property that will be useful for the decryption
phase.
As mentioned previously the public and secret keys are a collection of A′js and ~sj
′s
respectively, with each element corresponding to a specific level 0 ≤ j ≤ L. Therefore it
is necessary to provide a method of switching between each of the keys. This is achieved
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through the novel method introduced in [14] called key switching which is described in
more detail in section 3.3.6, thus concluding the description of the key generation phase.
3.3.3 Encryption and Decryption
Having generated the necessary secret and public keys of the FHE scheme it is now
possible to encrypt and decrypt messages. This section will describe this stage of the
scheme.
Encryption
Let the message m ∈ A2 be the message that we want to encrypt. Given a previously
generated public key A as described in the previous section and message m we set the
message vector ~m ← (m, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ An+1q for vector dimension n and modulus q as
defined in the parameter set paramsj in the previous sections.
We then randomly choose a vector ~r ← AN2 typically from a uniform distribution.
Note that the coefficients of the vector are from the range [0, 2) where [·, ·) denotes a half-
open interval that only includes the endpoint of the left side of the interval. Specifically in
our case the coefficients are integers chosen to be greater than or equal to 0 and less than
2. This is to ensure the vector has a low norm, where the norm we use is the Euclidean
norm or L2-norm. Given an n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn the Euclidean norm of
a vector ~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) is defined as ‖~v‖2 :=
√
v21 + · · ·+ v2n. Choosing ~r to have
low norm reduces the size of the “noise” which is important to keep small, the reason
for this will become apparent in the following subsection describing the homomorphic
arithmetic operations.
Having obtained the message vector ~m, the randomly chosen vector ~r and given the
public key A we define the ciphertext ~c ← ~m + AT r ∈ An+1q , where AT denotes the
transpose of matrix A.
Note that when encrypting, the resultant ciphertext ~c always begins at the highest
circuit level L. Thus the public key received as an input to the encryption method is
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typically AL, which in turn produces a ciphertext ~c ∈ An+1qL .
Decryption
Suppose we have a ciphertext that is encrypted under some secret key ~sj . In [14, p.11]
it is noted that the ciphertext could be augmented with an index which indicates which
level it belongs to. In order to decrypt the ciphertext we perform an inner product, as
defined in definition 3.2.1. This is then followed by two modulo operations, first with
the ciphertext modulus q and then with the plaintext modulus p. We use the notation
[e]q to denote the modulo operation e mod q for some element e and modulus q.
The decryption formula as stated on [14, p.8] produces a plaintext message m ←
[[〈~c, ~sj〉]q]2. This decryption formula involves three steps. Firstly the inner product
between the input ciphertext ~c with its corresponding secret key ~sj . This is then followed
by the reduction of the output with q, note that this modulus will also be relative to
the same level as the secret key, namely qj . Finally reducing the output again with the
plaintext modulus, which in our case is chosen to be 2, produces the desired plaintext
message m.
3.3.4 Arithmetic operations
Subsequent to obtaining the ability to decrypt and encrypt homomorphically, we can
now explore how this enables us to perform arithmetic operations between ciphertexts,
namely
• Add(pk, c1, c2): Given two ciphertexts c1 = E(m1) and c2 = E(m2) perform an
addition operation resulting in a ciphertext c3 containing the sum of the two cipher-
texts c3 = E(m1 +m2) = E(m1) + E(m2) = c1 + c2.
• Mult(pk, c1, c2): Given two ciphertexts c1 = E(m1) and c2 = E(m2) perform a
multiplication operation resulting in a ciphertext c3 containing the product of the
two ciphertexts c3 = E(m1 ×m2) = E(m1)× E(m2) = c1 × c2.
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Notice that each method also takes the set of public keys pk as an input. This is
necessary for performing any key switching of modulus switching as pk contains every
public key as well information on how to switch between them.
Prior to describing these arithmetic operations, we remind the reader that we encrypt
our messages with an added “noise” element, previously defined as ~r ← AN2 in the
encryption phase and ~e ← χN in the public key generation phase. This is in order to
ensure the security of our homomorphic encryption scheme based on the GLWE problem.
However a byproduct of this method is the noise element grows when homomorphic
operations are performed on a ciphertext. This is the reason why it is important to keep
the noise elements as small as is feasible without jeopardising the security. Due to all
elements existing within a modulo ring Aq, the coefficients of the noise polynomial must
be kept smaller than qj as to avoid wraparound. If wraparound occurs, in other words
the noise grows larger than q and is reduced to a smaller element, then the decryption
process will not successfully remove all of the noise.
This in turn means there are a limited number of operations that one can perform on
a ciphertext before the noise element grows too large and no further operations can be
performed while continuing to preserve the correctness of the message when decrypted.
Gentry introduced the computationally expensive operation known as bootstrapping [39]
however the BGV scheme introduced modulus switching as a computationally cheaper
alternative.
Brakerski et al. begin by defining an arithmetic circuit of depth L and generating
the necessary parameters. This is the reason for generating a chain of moduli, each
corresponding to a specific level of the arithmetic circuit that we want our FHE scheme
to be capable of evaluating. A more detailed description of this method is provided in
section 3.3.5.
It is therefore preferable to have a ciphertext which has been freshly encrypted to
have a minimal amount of noise so as to maximise the number of operations that can be
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performed before the requirement of modulus switching.
Addition
The addition of two ciphertexts produces another ciphertext containing an encryption
of the sum. A byproduct of this is the noise, n, grows at most linearly at a rate of 2n in
the number of addition operations.
Given two ciphertexts ~c1 and ~c2, first ensure they are both encrypted under the same
secret key ~sj as the BGV scheme does not support operations between two ciphertexts
encrypted under different keys. If they are not initially encrypted under the same key
then perform a “FHE.Refresh” method [14, p.12] which involves a modulus switch oper-
ation followed by a key switch operation so that the ciphertext corresponding to the
higher circuit level is brought down to the same level as the ciphertext which to be
operated with.
Now that the two ciphertexts correspond to the same secret key ~sj , set ~c3 ← ~c1 +
~c2 mod qj . This is a vector addition, which is an entry-wise addition operation. We then
interpret ~c3 as a ciphertext under the secret key ~sj
′ = ~sj ⊗ ~sj , the tensor of the secret
key ~sj .
We then “refresh” the ciphertext ~c3 by modulus switching from qj to qj−1 and then
key switching from ~sj
′ to ~sj−1. This produces another “refreshed” ciphertext ~c4 corre-
sponding to the secret key ~sj−1 and is output by the addition method.
Multiplication
The addition of two ciphertexts produces another ciphertext containing an encryption
of the product. As with addition, the noise grows with each operation. However, the
noise, n, grows at a faster rate of at most n2 in the number of multiplications.
Given two ciphertexts ~c1 and ~c2, first ensure they are both encrypted under the same
secret key ~sj as in the addition routine. If not then perform the necessary modulus and
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key switching operations to bring the ciphertext corresponding to the higher level down
to the level of the other ciphertext.
Subsequent to obtaining two ciphertexts correspond to the same secret key ~sj , set
~c3 ← ~c1 ⊗ ~c2 mod qj . The multiplication of two ciphertexts is a vector tensor product,
also known as the outer product, operation defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.1 (Tensor product). Given two vectors v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) and w =
(w1, w2, . . . , wm), we can form a tensor denoted by v ⊗ w which is equivalent to vwT .
This produces a matrix
v ⊗ w =

v1w1 v1w2 . . . v1wm





vnw1 vnw2 . . . vnwm

The resultant ciphertext ~c3 representing the product is encrypted under the secret
key ~sj
′ = ~sj ⊗ ~sj and thus needs to be “refreshed” as in the addition phase via modulus
switching from qj to qj−1 and then key switching from ~sj
′ to ~sj−1. This produces another
“refreshed” ciphertext ~c4 corresponding to the secret key ~sj−1 and is output by the
multiplication method.
It is remarked that since addition increases the noise considerably slower than mul-
tiplication, it is not necessary to refresh the ciphertext after each addition operation.
3.3.5 Modulus Switching
Modulus switching is the novel technique proposed by Brakerski et al. [14][Section 3.3]
that introduced the concept of leveled FHE schemes. The concept involves a “chain”
of moduli q0 < q1 < ... < qL where L is the number of levels in the scheme and newly
encrypted ciphertexts begin being defined in AqL and the lowest level ciphertext defined
in Aq0 . Ciphertexts at the i’th level are vectors of two dimensions ~c = (c0, c1) ∈ (Aqi)2.
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Given a ciphertext ~c that encrypts a plaintext message m, suppose the noise element
is reaching the upper threshold and we require to reduce its relative magnitude without
altering the encrypted message. This is achieved by scaling the ciphertext down by a
factor ∆ = q/q′ where q is the current ciphertext prime and q′ is the ciphertext prime
that we are modulus switching down to. We require the ciphertext ~c′ that is the A-vector
closest to ∆ · ~c such that ~c′ ≡ (q/q′)~c(mod p).
It is formally shown in [13, Lemma 4] that it is possible to change the inner modulus of
the decryption equation m = [[〈~c,~s〉]q]p while maintaining the correctness of decryption
under the same secret key.
Following the optimised procedure described in [40] the method of modulus switching
down is as follows:
• Let ~d = ~c mod ∆
• Add or subtract multiples of ∆ from the coefficients of ~d until ~d mod p ≡ 0
• Set ~c′ = ~c− ~d
3.3.6 Key-Switching
Also known as dimension reduction, the key-switching method [14][Section 3.2] is used
to reduce the dimension of the ciphertext after a multiplication operation. Given two
ciphertexts ~c1,~c2 the multiplication of two ciphertexts is the tensor product ~c1⊗~c2. This
ciphertext can still be decrypted using the tensor product of the secret key ~s ⊗ ~s using
the same decryption technique, this is shown in Section 4.5.2. Naturally, the dimension
of the ciphertext cannot continue to increase indefinitely if the efficiency of the scheme is
to be preserved since otherwise, the ciphertext grows in size exponentially in the number
of multiplications performed.
The procedure converts a tensored ciphertext ~c1 decryptable by the tensored secret
key ~s1 ⊗ ~s1 into a smaller two dimensional ciphertext ~c2 that is decryptable by a new
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secret key ~s2. The reason for switching to a different secret key is to avoid the issue of
circular security.
Given the resultant ciphertext from a multiplication operation ~c = (c0, c1, c2) which
is decryptable under the secret key ~s = (1, s, s2) as shown in Section 4.5.2. We want
to key-switch to a canonical ciphertext ~c′ = (c′0, c
′
1) that is decryptable under a new
secret key ~s′ = (1, s′) so as to reduce the ciphertext to a 2-dimensional vector. This is
achieved through defining a key-switching matrix W = (a, b) ∈ A2×3 where ai ∈R Aq is
a polynomial chosen randomly from the ring Aq and bi = si + p · e − ai · s′. Note that
the i-th column of W contains an encryption of the new secret key under the i-th part
of the old secret key where ~si = s
i. Then we obtain our the ciphertext ~c′ as so:






(bi · ci, ai · ci) (3.3)
This correctness of this is shown in [48][Section 3.1.6] in addition to an optimisation
that reduces the total amount of noise added through this operation via decomposing
the ciphertext into sections known as “digits”.
3.3.7 Batching
Batching was as optimisation introduced in the BGV scheme [14, p.16] which reduced the
per-gate computation from quasi-linear in the security parameter λ to poly-logarithmic
by packing data into a single ciphertext.
Smart and Vercauteren [74] were the first to rigorously analyse batching in a FHE
context. They observed that RLWE-based ciphertexts can have many plaintext slots,
associated to the factorisation of the plaintext space into algebraic ideals.
For simplicity reasons the plaintext space was previously defined as A2, however the
FHE scheme functions correctly in the same way when using a plaintext space Ap for some
prime p. This allows for the batching of several modulo-p entries into a single ciphertext
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which are treated independently. Additionally, it allows the possibility of manipulating
polynomials in each slot each of degree n, where n is the dimension defined in the setup
phase described in section 3.3.1.
Given the plaintext space Ap = Zp[x]/(xd + 1) for some plaintext prime p and some
degree d that is a power of 2. Despite each element of Ap being a polynomial of degree
d − 1, it is possible to use a specific encoding to perform operations in an entry-wise
manner. This is due to evaluating an arithmetic circuit over Ap on input x ∈ Anp
implicitly evaluates, for each i, the same arithmetic circuit over Api on input x projected
down to Anpi . This is formally captured in [14, Theorem 4, p.18] as follows
Theorem 2. Let p = 1 mod 2d be a prime of size polynomial in λ. The RLWE-based
instantiation of FHE using the ring R = Z[x]/(xd+1) can be adapted to use the plaintext
space Rp = ⊗di=1Rpi, while preserving correctness and the same asymptotic performance.
For any boolean circuit f of depth L, the scheme can homomorphically evaluate f on `
sets of inputs with per-gate computation Õ(λ · L3/min{d, `}).
Theorem 2 relies on a well known theorem in number theory known as the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) defined as
Theorem 3 (Chinese Remainder Theorem). Let R be a commutative ring with unity,
and I1, I2, . . . , In be finitely many ideals of R such that Ii + Ij = R for any two distinct
elements i and j of {1,2,. . . ,n}. Then, I1I2 . . . In = I1 ∩ I2 ∩ · · · ∩ In and the canonical
ring homomorphism R/(I1I2 . . . In)→ R/I1 ×R/I2 × · · · ×R/In is an isomorphism.
Applying this theorem to the FHE scheme, given a plaintext space Ap = Zp[x]/(xd +
1), for some prime p, it is possible to break the ring down into n ideals Ii = Fi(x) where
Fi(x) is an arbitrary factor of x
d + 1 modulo the p for 0 < i ≤ n. These ideals are
relatively prime, thus applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem yields the isomorphism
Ap ∼= Ap/I1 × Ap/I2 × · · · × Ap/In. This result means that applying a sequence of
arithmetic operations in the ring Ap is equivalent to performing the same operations in
each Ap/Ii independently and then applying the isomorphism on the result.
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3.3.8 Cryptographic Usage
Generally, FHE is useful in scenarios in which a client wishes to outsource computations
on data without revealing the data being computed upon. This causes FHE to typically
be used against an honest-but-curious adversary.
The honest-but-curious adversary is a legitimate participant in a protocol who will
not deviate from the defined protocol but will attempt to learn all possible information
from received messages.
Since messages received in an FHE protocol are encrypted and remain so throughout
the protocol, the honest-but-curious adversary is unable to learn any information about
the data being processed.
FHE can be of use in scenarios where data needs to be processed, however the data
itself is confidential, such as in the medical sector. For example, there has been extensive
work on using FHE to perform analytics, like logistic regression, on medical data [23, 9,
2, 76, 56].
There has also been various work applying FHE to private information retrieval (PIR)
[78, 34, 55, 1]. PIR is when a client desires to query a server and retrieve data from
its database at index i while preserving the privacy of the index from the server. This
led to work on a version of PIR which had a stronger security requirement, known as
single-database PIR. Single-database PIR retains the property of keeping the index secret
from the server but has the added requirement of the client only receiving the entry it
requested. This is also known as oblivious transfer which saw further application of FHE
schemes [25, 58, 42, 7].
3.4 Summary
This section has provided a description of the underlying theoretical structure of the
BGV-variant of a FHE scheme that will be used throughout the future research in this
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thesis. The LWE problem, which the security of FHE schemes are reliant upon was
introduced by Regev and shown to be sufficiently hard. This led to the lattice-based
encryption schemes that allowed the breakthrough of Gentry’s FHE scheme in 2009.
Having shown the community it was theoretically possible to build an FHE scheme,
albeit an inefficient one, this sparked increased interest and research into building new
HE schemes. This was eventually followed by the two major techniques introduced to
Gentry’s scheme to create the “leveled” FHE scheme. More specifically, the modulus
switching and key-switching techniques that were described in this section.
Chapter 4
Anonymous Routing
This chapter will attempt to further improve the understanding of FHE, in particular
the BGV scheme. This will build upon the theory introduced in section 3.3 through
applying the foundational operations such as addition and multiplication to a concrete
example.
As mentioned previously, a common use case for FHE is the outsourcing of computa-
tion on sensitive data. One common application of FHE is for a homomorphic compari-
son algorithm, often used for homomorphic database queries. This section explores and
demonstrates the capability for FHE and namely a homomorphic comparison algorithm
to be applied to scenarios outside of database queries. We demonstrate the possibil-
ity of using FHE to provide a different type of security than just data security but
user anonymity. This section describes a routing algorithm that uses FHE to provide
anonymity against a global adversary.
4.1 Introduction
In the technological era, communication has clearly become an important service whether
it be over long or short distances. A desirable property for communications is the privacy
of the information being sent or received. However, providing data security is sometimes
34
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not enough for clients to be confident in using such a service for communicating. Clients
may often desire to remain anonymous when communicating with others, whether it be
the sender, recipient, or both. This can be achieved in various ways, including encryption.
This chapter is particularly interested in using Fully Homomorphic Encryption to provide
communications which are not only private but also anonymous.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) was initially introduced in 1995 by Chor et al.
[26]. The concept involves a client desiring to query a database, held on some server,
using an index while maintaining the privacy of the index from the server. The trivial
solution to this scenario would be to simply return the entire database to the client
however this would incur a large communication cost and be impractical. An extensively
explored solution to this problem is a homomorphic database query [78, 34, 55, 1]. The
technique enables a client to query a database without showing the intent of the query
by encrypting it. This is a natural application of a homomorphic comparison algorithm.
This chapter explores the versatility of FHE through the use of such an algorithm outside
of the “typical” scenario. Specifically, in applying FHE to the anonymity domain.
Using the terminology proposed by Pfitzmann and Hansen [65], anonymity can be
defined as when a “subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity
set.” Specifically, given a set of possible participants within a network it is impossible
to identify the active participants at any given time. From this definition we can define
specific subsets with respect to the roles of the participants. Namely, we can define sender
and recipient anonymity as the ability for a particular individual to be unidentifiable
within the sender and recipient anonymity sets respectively.
Anonymity schemes generally aim to provide message unlinkability, which is when it
is not possible for an adversary to discriminate who is communicating with whom within
a network where they can observe both sets of the senders and recipients.
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4.2 Existing Methods for Anonymity
Due to the increase in interest for anonymity tools there has been a lot of previous
research into this area. As a result of this, there exist various available services, among
them are Tor [33], Freenet [28] and I2P [79]. These three are effective and readily acces-
sible tools which have gained considerable momentum in usage and popularity. As with
many schemes in security, these anonymity services are also susceptible to adversaries
and a range of different attacks. Thus constant work is being performed to improve the
usability and strength of these schemes.
Numerous anonymity schemes are based upon early work on a tool known as mix
networks [17]. They route packets across a network via proxies known as mixes. Each
mix in the path uses public key encryption, therefore an additional layer of encryption
is applied proportional to the number of mixes in the path. Due to the message being
relayed across the network via intermediary proxies, a passive attacker at the entry and
exit point to the network is unable to determine the recipient and sender of the message
respectively. In order to improve the scheme’s strength against de-anonymisation, more
notably correlation attacks, the mixes implement aggregation and introduce random
delays upon packets received. Although these techniques improve the robustness against
attacks, they in turn decrease the performance of the network. Thus mix networks are
known as a high latency anonymous communication network. This type of anonymous
communication network (ACN) is useful for services such as email or other services where
the anonymity is more important than the speed of transmission.
As there became a higher demand for real time communication there developed a
greater need for a new type of ACN, more notably, low-latency anonymous communi-
cation networks. This gave rise to an onion routing service known as Tor. Tor relies
on routing packets across an overlay network know as a circuit. Circuits are paths in
the network that contain numerous nodes known as onion routers. A packet that is sent
across the network is encrypted with several layers of encryption. Each layer is encrypted
under a different symmetric key relative to the pre-negotiated secret key held by each
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onion router in the designated path that the packet will take across the network. As
a result of the following set-up, each node in the network only knows the immediately
preceding and succeeding node in the path. Thus the exit node, i.e. the last node in
the network before the final destination does not know the original sender of the packet
but only the final recipient. In addition to this, since it is not necessary for users of
the service to also run their own Tor onion router, they may not necessarily be a part
of the Tor network. Therefore there will exist an entry node into the network from the
recipient. Due to Tor being a low-latency anonymity service, the onion routers do not
utilise delays or permutations of the packets. Subsequently, Tor is susceptible to attacks
and more notably, like all low latency anonymous communication networks, does not
protect communications against a global adversary [52].
As previously mentioned, Tor does not consider the participants of the network to
individually be a part of the routing network itself. Unlike Tor there are other ACNs that
regard the set of users as additional possible routing nodes within the network. Among
these peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, Freenet and I2P are among the most renowned.
Freenet provides an anonymous distributed file system. Each node of the network main-
tains a local data store and a routing table containing addresses of other available nodes
within the system. This allows for the publication and retrieval of information across
the network anonymously without the requirement of a centralised infrastructure.
Like Tor, I2P provides an anonymous communication service that is peer-to-peer
using an overlay network. This tool also utilises ideas from early work on mix networks,
end-to-end encryption and similar to Tor, provides an additional layer of encryption for
each node that the packet is routed through. Packets sent across the network are routed
through a user-defined set of routers known as tunnels. These tunnels also contain the
node of the user as a member of the path. Other than the nodes owned by the users
being directly involved in the anonymous routing procedure, unlike Tor the ACN is also
fully distributed as it does not rely upon any centralised directory servers.
The aim of these types of networks is to provide greater protection against attackers,
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especially in regard to the previous scenario involving the exit/entry nodes in the Tor
environment. More specifically each node within a P2P network is unable to discern
whether the previous node in the path is the original source of the information or simply
a relay node. The same applies to discerning whether the succeeding node in the path is
the intended recipient of the information. This aids in protecting users from attackers but
as stated before, as I2P and Tor are low-latency anonymous communication networks,
they fail to protect against an adversary that has the ability to monitor the majority of
the network, which the scheme in this section aims to provide.
4.3 Mathematics
Before we go into the description of the algorithm, we will provide a brief description of
the mathematical structure that is required for an FHE scheme to function.
The FHE scheme used is a variant of the BGV scheme [14], described in section 3.3
which uses a polynomial ring A = Z[X]/(Φm(X)) that is defined as an integer ring over
a chosen m’th cyclotomic number field. Our plaintext space is defined to be the ring Ap,
where p is our prime plaintext modulus which reduces our ring Ap = A/(pA).
A plaintext element a ∈ Ap is a polynomial of degree φ(m) with coefficients modulo
p, where φ(m) is Euler’s totient which coincides with the number of numbers smaller
than m which are co-prime. As described in sections 3.3.7 and 4.5.1, we can decompose
our plaintext a into a ‘slot‘ representation to give us SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple
Data) capabilities shown in figure 4.1.
Recall from section 3.3.7, we have the isomorphism Ap ∼= Ap/(F1(x))×Ap/(F2(x))×
· · ·×Ap/(Fl(x)), where the number of slots is defined by l = φ(m)/d, where d is the degree
of Fi(x). This implies that our cyclotomic polynomial decomposes into l irreducible
polynomials each of degree d, namely Φm(x) = F1(x) · F2(x) . . . Fl(x)(mod p).
To maximise the efficiency of packing data into the plaintext slots, we can encode
data across the coefficients of the polynomials in each slot. The specific encoding is
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described in section 4.5.1.
For the remainder of this chapter we will consider our plaintext encoded in ‘slot’
representation as defined in figure 4.1, where each slot 0 < i ≤ l contains a degree-d
polynomial Ri. Since the underlying structure of the plaintext and ciphertext are the
same, we shall use the term ‘plaintext slots‘ to describe the slot structure of both the
plaintext and ciphertext. We will use ciphertext when describing something specific to
the ciphertext space.
Figure 4.1: Plaintext slot representation where a ∈ Ap is a polynomial and each slot
Ri ≡ a mod Fi is a polynomial modulo a factor Fi of the cyclotomic polynomial Φm(x).
The ciphertext space is defined using a ciphertext modulus q to be Aq = A/(qA)
where the q is an odd number such that q  p. Note that q is a product of a ‘chain’ of
odd prime numbers q0, . . . , qL which makes up a modulus chain as described in section
3.3.
In order to decrypt our ciphertexts we perform an inner product operation, denoted
by 〈~u,~v〉 where ~u,~v are vectors of equal length. Therefore we have 〈~u,~v〉 =
∑n
i=1 ui · vi,
where ui is the i-th element of ~u. This is subsequently followed by a modulus reduction
function which we denote as [a]p, which equates to calculating a mod p.
4.4 The Algorithm
A brief description of the algorithm will be presented below. The FHE scheme used is
a variant of the BGV scheme [14] described in detail in section 3.3. We will attempt to
use notation consistent with the previous chapter wherever possible.
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At a high level, each message sent across the network is encrypted using FHE and
contains a tag within the message, which is also encrypted into the same ciphertext.
The tag is a label stating the recipient of the message and thus the route it should take
across the network. Each node will contain a local list of possible labels that will be
encoded using FHE. The node will then perform a homomorphic comparison operation
between the tag and the locally stored labels. The node then will send a ciphertext
along each outbound channel but only a single ciphertext will contain the message.
Once the ciphertext has reached its destination, the recipient can decrypt the message
conventionally using FHE. This removes the trust of the individual nodes in the network
and provides anonymity against a global adversary through the security assumptions of
FHE.
For simplicity, the algorithm will be described using a server-client model where the
sever containing an arbitrary number of nodes and the sender and receiver are the clients.
The algorithm consists of three major phases as follows:
1. Pre-Computation: Performed on client side, the sender encodes their message
into a plaintext polynomial. The encoded plaintext will then be encrypted using
the public encryption key of the intended recipient. This section of the algorithm
can be broken into the following sub-algorithms:
(a) Encode: Encode the plaintext message as a polynomial a ∈ Ap as depicted in
figure 4.1.
(b) Encrypt : Using the recipients public key, encrypt the plaintext polynomial a
as a ciphertext c := Enc(a).
2. Anonymous Routing: Performed on the server side, a node receives a message
and a label both of which are encrypted. The node contains a list of labels corre-
sponding to each output wire and compares the query label with each local label
homomorphically. The homomorphic comparison will produce an encrypted mask.
This message is multiplied with each mask and then sent to the next node in the
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network. This is performed using the following sub-algorithms:
(a) Homomorphic Comparison: Compares the query label of the ciphertext with
the labels held locally. This is carried out through the following:
i. Subtraction: Compute the difference via a slotwise subtraction opera-
tion between the encrypted query label and the local labels. Produces a
ciphertext with 0 in the slots that matched and non-zero otherwise.
(b) Mask Creation: Using the computed difference, generate a mask which will be
an encryption of {0,1}, where 1 represents the matching label and 0 otherwise.
This can be broken into the following:
i. Fermat’s Little Theorem (FLT): Given the difference c, use the result of
FLT: cp−1 ≡ 1 mod p to map all slots with non-zero values to 1 and 0
otherwise.
ii. Mask Inversion: Invert the values of the slots such that 1 is mapped to
0 and vice versa.
iii. Partial Match Removal: Remove partial matches through an inter-slot
multiplication of the mask. Produces an encryption of 1 if there was an
exact match and 0 otherwise.
(c) Message Split: Given a mask ciphertext for each output wire of the node,
multiply the message ciphertext with the mask and then send the result to the
next node in the network. If there was a matching label the original message
is sent unmodified, otherwise the message is multiplied by an encryption of 0
and the zeroed out message is sent.
3. End Phase: The recipient receives an encrypted message from the routing server
and retrieves the message.
(a) Decrypt: Decrypt the received ciphertext c′ using the secret key of the recip-
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ient to obtain a plaintext polynomial a ∈ Ap.
(b) Decode: Decode the plaintext polynomial from polynomial representation to
ASCII.
This algorithm can be viewed as an implementation of a variant of an anonymous
communication technique known as “the mix” but in a Fully Homomorphic environment.
The benefit of this over using the generic method which utilises a public encryption
scheme at each node present in the network, the nodes must be trusted to not leak any
information about the recipient of any messages it receives. Thus if a node in the network
becomes compromised by an adversary then the anonymity of the recipient will become
compromised. This scheme removes the trust required of the nodes in the communication
network.
4.5 Implementation
This section contains a description of the implementation of the anonymous routing
algorithm mentioned in section 4.4, providing a description of how each step is performed
homomorphically.
4.5.1 Pre-Computation
The first step in using any FHE scheme is the parameter selection. This is highly
dependent on the algorithm being performed as well as the data involved but most
importantly on the security level as described in section 3.3.1.
In order to select suitable parameters, we must understand how data is represented
in the BGV leveled homomorphic encryption scheme [14]. As described in section 3.3.7,
this variant of the BGV scheme enables batching of several modulo-p entries into slots
of a single plaintext which are treated independently. It also allows for the possibility
of manipulating polynomials of d degree in each slot of the plaintext, where d is a value
determined by the chosen parameters.
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Using a plaintext space Ap := Zp[x]/(Φm(x)) for some prime number p and integer
m. The elements of Ap are polynomials, with coefficients modulo p, of degree φ(m)− 1,
where φ(m) is Euler’s totient that defines the number of integers smaller than m which
are co-prime. We are able to encode our data in a way that enables us to perform
operations in an entry-wise manner. This is possible due to the following decomposition





using the Chinese remainder theorem for rings shown in Theorem 3 where each Ei
is isomorphic to Ap/(Fi(x)), where Fi(x) is an arbitrary degree-d factor of the m-th
cyclotomic polynomial Φm(x) modulo p. The maximum number of slots is defined as
l = φ(m)/d, where d is the order of p in the multiplicative group Z∗m. This also coincides
with the degree of Fi(x). Since the rings Ei are isomorphic to each other we can set
E := E1 and thusly consider the isomorphism Ap ∼= El. More specifically we have
Φm(X) = F1(X) ·F2(X) . . . Fl(X) (mod p). Thus a plaintext polynomial message a ∈ Ap
represents an l-vector containing entries a mod Fi for i in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Therefore
consideration must be taken to choose m and p to define the correct size and shape of
the plaintexts given our data as well as the level of security.
Encoding the Message Data
In this chapter we consider messages that can be packed into a single plaintext, however
if the number of characters exceeds φ(m) then we can encode the message across multiple
plaintexts. Due to the ability to pack data across the slots of a plaintext, we can use
logical SIMD capabilities. Therefore we encode our message across the plaintext slots.
A typical representation of data is ASCII. Assuming we want to represent all print-
able ASCII characters in decimal representation then we must choose an algebra that
enables us to represent at least 95 characters. Thus we choose a plaintext prime of
p = 97 to represent all of the necessary characters. Due to the first 32 characters being
non-printable characters, when encoding the message, the printable characters will be
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remapped by subtracting 32 from the original decimal representation of the character
(i.e. The white space character 32 is mapped to 0, the letter ‘A’ is mapped from 65 to
33 etc.). With this mapping, all printable characters can be represented as an integer in
the range (0, 95).
Given an algebra, each slot of our plaintext is a polynomial in Ei, as in equation
4.1, for slot i with coefficient vector ~v = (v0, . . . , vd). We encode each ASCII character
as a single entry of the coefficient vector ~v, repeating the process for each slot of the
plaintext. This means we can pack up to d characters per plaintext slot. As a single
plaintext element is a polynomial in the ring Ap ∼= El, where l = φ(m)/d, then we can
pack up to d · l = φ(m) characters across an entire plaintext. For typical levels of security
λ ≈ 100 we can expect φ(m) values of around 10000.
Encoding the Labels
For simplicity of describing the scheme we assume that each label is encrypted in a
single plaintext. We consider a label to be a unique identifier to a single node in the
network. This can be a single integer number represented in binary. Considering the
current standard of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, IPv6 uses an address size of 2128
which is considered to be sufficient for the foreseeable future. Therefore we require a
plaintext that allows us to represent 128-bit numbers.
Since we are using a single plaintext per label we can pack the number across the
coefficient vector ~v = (v0, . . . , vd) of each slot. It is possible to pack multiple labels into a
single plaintext to optimise for efficiency which will be discussed in section 4.6, however
for simplicity we consider a single plaintext encoding a single label, represented as a
128-bit integer.
It is noted that the labels of each local node must be encoded in the same way as the
label sent by the client to ensure the correctness of the homomorphic matching algorithm.
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Encryption
Since we are using a public key encryption scheme, the encoded plaintexts are encrypted
using the public key of the intended recipient. The client encrypts both the label and the
message data with the same public key using the encryption routine described in section
3.3.3. The ciphertexts are then sent to recipient via the anonymous routing network.
4.5.2 Anonymous Routing
In this phase of the scheme, a node in our communication network receives two cipher-
texts, one containing the label of the destination node and another containing the mes-
sage data. The job of this node is to route the information received onto the correct
path of the network to the intended recipient(s).
To achieve this, the node performs a homomorphic comparison of the encrypted
label with each label held locally. For each output wire from the node, there will be a
corresponding list of unique labels of all subsequent nodes in the network. Also each list
of labels will be disjoint from each other. This means a maximum of one list can contain
a matching label, furthermore there can only be a maximum of one match across all lists.
The result of the homomorphic comparison will be used to produce a single mask
ciphertext for each outward path from the node which will be described in detail in
section 4.5.2. The mask will be an encryption of one if the label was present in the list
and a zero otherwise. Using this mask the node will multiply it with the message and
send the new message ciphertext with the initially received label along each output edge.
The original message will only be sent through at most one output edge. All other edges
will receive a ciphertext containing an encryption of zero.
We make the assumption, without loss of generality, that the network is a directed,
thus a message cannot be sent along the same wire from which it was received. In other
words, each node has one input edge and there exists no loops within the network. This
can be achieved through introduction of a protocol.
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Homomorphic Comparison
The node performs a homomorphic comparison of the received label, which we will call
the query label, with the labels held locally at the node. Each node in the network will
contain a list of labels, one list for each output wire. The labels correspond to each node
further along the network. Each list contains unique labels and each list is disjoint from
each other. Subsequently a homomorphic comparison will only produce a maximum of
one unique match across the union of lists of a single node.
For each list of labels we start by computing the difference between the query label
and each node label from the list. This is achieved by subtracting the query label from
each node label slotwise.
We note that the labels held locally are known to the node and need not be encrypted.
However, the computation between the query label and local node label results in a
ciphertext that is encrypted under the initial public key of the client. Thusly, each node
cannot see any result subsequent to the first operation.
Subsequent to the subtraction operation, the difference of the query label and the
compared node label is held in the resultant ciphertext. This ciphertext will be an
encryption of zero if and only if the query label matched the node label, otherwise it
will be non-zero if they did not match. Now the node will need to convert the resultant
difference into a mask of ones and zeroes. Given that we have polynomials in the slots
of our ciphertext as described in section 4.5.1, to achieve this we will use a variant of
Fermat’s Little Theorem for polynomials:
Theorem 4 (Fermat’s Little Theorem). If we have a prime number p, then for any
non-zero polynomial a of degree d which is not divisible by p, the number ap
d−1− 1 is an
integer multiple of p i.e.
ap
d−1 ≡ 1 mod p
We adapt this result to create a generic function to achieve the behaviour desired.
Chapter 4. Anonymous Routing 47
This can be achieved naively through exponentiation, yet this would be expensive both
computationally and in terms of noise growth due to the large number of necessary
multiplications. To mitigate this we use a less noise expensive method of exponentiation
[44] which is implemented in HElib [46], namely the Frobenius automorphism
σ : X → Xp
Given our ciphertext c containing the difference, we must compute cp
d−1 and we note
the result




We can then compute cp
d−1 = c(1+p+···+p
d−1)(p−1) by initially computing cp−1 through
exponentiation and then applying the Frobenius automorphism σ(cp−1) = c(p−1)p. Thus





where σi(c) = cp
i
.




1, iff c = 0
0, otherwise.
(4.3)
Applying equation 4.3 to the difference ciphertext c, we obtain a one in each slot
where there was a match and a zero in all other slots of the ciphertext where no match
was present.
Chapter 4. Anonymous Routing 48
Since the local list contains unique labels, there can only be at most one label which
is an exact match corresponding to the query label. This matching label will produce a
mask containing a one across all slots of the ciphertext. However, partial matches can
occur and must be removed.
To achieve this we perform a slotwise multiplication of the mask ciphertext. This is
done via creating a copy of the mask ciphertext, performing a rotation of the slots and
then multiplying the rotated mask with itself. This results in a slotwise multiplication
and is repeated for all permutations of the ciphertext slots which is l = φ(m)/d. There-
fore, if a mask ciphertext contains at least one slot containing a zero, this slot will be
multiplied across the remaining slots of the ciphertext, resulting in a mask of zeroes.
Since there will always be a maximum of a single unique match, the resultant masks
can be aggregated into a single ciphertext. This will produce a single mask ciphertext for
each list corresponding to each output edge of the node. The mask will be an encryption
of one for the correct onward path and a zero otherwise.
Routing the Message
Using the resultant masks for each output edge of the node, we perform a multiplication
between the mask and the received message data. For the edge containing the matching
label (producing the mask ciphertext of ones), multiplying the mask with the message
data will leave the data unchanged as this is the intended route of the message. For all
other routes the message data will be multiplied with a mask of zeros, thus zeroing out
the data and producing a ciphertext of zeroes.
These resultant ciphertexts are then sent along the output edges to the next node
where another homomorphic comparison takes place until it reaches the edge of the
network. Since a ciphertext is sent along each edge of the network, it provides total
anonymity against a global adversary, which will be discussed further in section 4.6.
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4.5.3 Retrieving The Message
Subsequent to the receiving a message from the routing server, the recipient decrypts the
encrypted message data. As described in section 3.3.3, the recipient calculates [〈~c, ~sk〉]p.
Namely, the inner product of the ciphertext with their secret key followed by a modulo
operation with the plaintext prime p. This produces a plaintext containing an encoding
of the original message data sent by the client.
The plaintext is a polynomial with coefficients representing ASCII characters. The
recipient computes the inverse of the encoding algorithm to reproduce the original ASCII
data.
4.6 Discussion
Through the use of FHE, this algorithm provides security and anonymity against a
network that is an honest-but-curious adversary. Conventional routing algorithms use
standard public key encryption to secure the data begin sent across the network as well
as provide a level of anonymity. However, trust must still be placed in the individual
nodes of the network as each node is aware of the previous node in the chain as well as
the subsequent node to relay the message to. This is because the data is encrypted in
layers and as each node in the chain decrypts a layer, it reveals the address of the next
node in the chain.
The main disadvantage of these conventional algorithms such as Tor and I2P are they
are not secure against a global adversary. Given an entity that can passively observe the
network globally, it can deanonymise users of the network [52]. The algorithm described
in this chapter removes this vulnerability because none of the nodes in the network need
to decrypt and thus the nodes themselves do not know the route of the data across the
network.
More specifically, an adversary that can observe the entire network will see a message
being sent to every node of the network, thus hiding the true recipient in the entire
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recipient set. This makes it hard for a global adversary to deanonymise the recipient as
the message path cannot simply be observed. Additionally, if an adversary intercepts a
message, not only will they be required to solve the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem
to decrypt the message without the secret key, there is no guarantee the ciphertext will
contain the message. Thus ‘zeroing’ the message data at each node increases the security
of the algorithm.
Additionally, with quantum computing looking to become prevalent in the future, it
is advantageous that FHE is a lattice based cryptography scheme as it is assumed hard
for polynomial-time quantum algorithms [61]. Due to Shor’s algorithm [71], conventional
public key encryption that is used in current anonymous routing algorithms may become
obsolete in a future where quantum computers are prevalent. Thus, this chapter presents
a scheme that is not only secure against a global adversary but also quantum resistant.
This type of algorithm also would not be possible with partially homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes as they only provide a single type of homomorphic operation, either addi-
tion or multiplication. This algorithm relies on the use of FHE to provide the operations
necessary to perform a comparison algorithm homomorphically.
Nevertheless, this algorithm also introduces the natural algorithmic overhead of using
FHE. This is evident in section 4.5.2, from the number of additional operations that are
needed to perform the comparison and mask creation homomorphically. This is due to
the inability to perform branching operations within FHE. This chapter demonstrates
how when using FHE, every branch of computation must be computed, similar to how
a ciphertext is sent along every edge of the network.
In order to provide total anonymity, this algorithm causes the network to be spammed
with encryptions of zeroes. Every node of the network must receive a ciphertext as it is
oblivious to the destination of the data. This is the main disadvantage of the algorithm
presented here.
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown the versatility of applying FHE to use cases within a realis-
tic scenario. This was demonstrated by applying a homomorphic matching algorithm
outside of the typical use-case of Private Information Retrieval.
It has been shown that FHE is useful for scenarios where a client is not willing to trust
a server in a client-server model, the routing network being the server in this example.
Despite the added algorithmic overhead, as hardware continues to increase in efficiency
and speed, FHE algorithms will continue to move ever closer to feasible running times.
Nevertheless, the main drawback of FHE is the inability to efficiently compute con-
ditional operations. FHE currently requires algorithms to compute every branch of
computation. Thus it remains an open question as to how to use FHE for anonymous




Previously, the use of FHE in a contrasting scenario to outsourcing computation with-
out revealing the data was explored, this was shown to be possible however extremely
impractical. Moving on from applying FHE to the field of networking, another interest-
ing aspect to explore is applying FHE on different types of data. This section presents
my work on defining and implementing rational numbers within an FHE scheme and the
application of this data representation to perform simple linear regression.
5.1 Introduction
Since, Gentry’s breakthrough [39] there have been numerous FHE schemes published
to date [10, 32, 59, 38, 41]. However the scheme of note [14], the BGV scheme, made
considerable gains in terms of efficiency and practical use of FHE.
Computing directly on encrypted data inherently comes at a cost in computational
resources, namely, computation time and memory for adequate levels of security. How-
ever, with more efficient algorithms, implementations, and hardware acceleration tech-
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niques, practical work using FHE can be done [31, 47] and this cost will continue to
reduce. This section does not focus on these major topics of practical FHE; instead,
we address another major obstacle to practical FHE, namely that of how to represent
numbers within FHE that approximate the real numbers or rationals so that useful
computation in analysis can be performed on encrypted data. This has far reaching
consequences in today’s data driven world.
The developer implementing homomorphic algorithms has to make use of an FHE
scheme’s particular algebra. This algebra is mostly not flexible to represent other alge-
bras required or data structures and care has to be taken when designing an appropriate
representation. Security and algrebas in FHE schemes are based on the Learning with
Errors (LWE) problem [67]. The FHE scheme that is used in this section is the BGV
variant implemented in the C++ library HElib [46]. The library makes use of the ring
LWE (RLWE) a variant of the LWE which uses integer polynomial rings as its algebra
where the message polynomial ring is given by A ∼= Z[X]/(Φm(X)) which is a univariate
integer ring Z[X] modulo the m’th cyclotomic polynomial.
A developer is challenged to understand the data and algorithm that will be used
and build the FHE solution accordingly in order to accommodate the data and how it
has to be computed on. This requires the user to have an in-depth understanding of
the underlying structure of the FHE scheme and its algebra as it is highly dependent
on numerous parameters which have a relatively complex relationship between them.
Parameter selection is out of scope of this thesis. To do analysis, the problem becomes
how to represent the required data in the available algebra. The issue of using the ring
A to represent data is that it does not represent an adequate approximation of the real
numbers or rationals. This limits the algorithms that can be performed as it cannot
for example perform real analysis. There have been attempts to solve this issue using
different representations such as fixed-point [4, 29, 11, 35] or floating-point arithmetic
[22] and simpler solutions such as representing fixed precision rationals using a fixed
multiplier to map rationals into integers [51, 18, 23, 19, 8]. A method of particular
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interest was that of representing rational numbers using continued fractions [27] which
introduced new challenges in efficiency in terms of computational complexity. Moreover,
there have been attempts to approximate certain continuous mathematical functions,
such as logistic regression, using a polynomial function such as the Taylor approximation
[9] and the minimax approximation [23].
The method of mapping the rationals into integers using a fixed scalar multiplier is
viewed to be a relatively efficient solution. However, it requires the user to keep track of
the scale as ciphertexts progress through an algorithm in order to ensure the messages are
decoded correctly. This is because as operations are performed upon each ciphertext, not
only the message within the ciphertext but the scale can also be modified via operations.
These schemes tend to have an increased rate of noise growth and thus require larger
values of p, the plaintext modulus, making it more challenging to select an optimal set
of parameters and causing increased difficulty in evaluating deeper circuits. There has
been work to improve this, such as the interesting method of changing the plaintext
modulus itself from an integer p to a polynomial instead [19]. This tackles the issue of
requiring larger values of p, although it creates a slightly more complicated scheme as
well as introducing some overhead, most notably in the decryption phase. Furthermore, a
number of previous attempts at representing rational numbers lack batching of data [22]
and thus the single instruction multiple data (SIMD) properties of ciphertexts cannot
be utilised.
The approach we have taken is to form objects that resemble fractions similarly to a
previous work [72] which was applied to feature detection and description of images. We
differ from the previous as it uses the Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) scheme [41] which
is an LWE variant that produces ciphertexts as matrices whereas this chapter describes
the implementation of the fractions using the algebra given by the BGV variant scheme
found in HElib. This chapter takes the description of the underlying theory further by
elaborating upon why it is possible to form these types of fractions from the existing
algebra used in FHE schemes. Moreover, our scheme is applied to linear regression and
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in contrast to [72] operates on the actual objects and not their components specific to a
computation.
Simple linear regression is performed where the input is a set of points of a straight
line with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). This creates a randomised “noisy” line
which is encrypted before the application of linear regression is performed homomorphi-
cally. The computation returns a line of best fit which ideally should be the equation of
the original line.
5.2 Implementation of Fractions
5.2.1 The Plaintext Space
The FHE scheme used will be a variant of the BGV scheme described in section 3.3. A
brief overview of the mathematical structures that will be used for the field of fractions
is given. The scheme has a plaintext space given by the ring Ap ∼= Zp[X]/(Φm(X))
where the prime number p is our plaintext space modulus. This leads to a structure
that supports SIMD operations per ciphertext where data can be packed into slots of
numbers in Fpλ where λ is the order of p in Z∗m, the multiplicative group modulo m.
The slots are the residues of the polynomial from Ap given by the modulo of a factor
of the cyclotomic polynomial Φm(X) mod p. The number of slots is dependent on the
corresponding Galois group size given by
∣∣∣∣Z∗m〈p〉
∣∣∣∣ = φ(m)λ
where φ is Euler’s totient function and λ is the smallest value given by pλ = 1 mod m.
The reader is reminded that the message or data polynomial is embedded in a larger
ring during encryption and with “noise” as required by the RLWE so the slots cannot
be seen without decryption.
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5.2.2 The Quasi-Rationals
To make fractions, the approach makes use of a well known mathematical result, namely
that every integral domain contains a field of fractions [75]. From the plaintext space
described above, we have an integral domain in the slots namely Fpλ . This is due to p
always being chosen to be prime. It is noted that every finite integral domain is a field
and thus the field of fractions of Fpλ is isomorphic to the field itself. At this point, the
reader may wonder what advantages, if any, are there for mapping to a representation
of the same object. The trade-off, which will become clearer, is that calculations are
simpler to reason about and some costly operations such as finding the multiplicative
inverse are now negligible. However, it should be noted that memory usage is at least
doubled to store these numbers and addition is more costly. As a simplification λ = 1
in this chapter but for other cases larger λ may be required for a field of fractions from
polynomials.
Recall that a field of fractions is constructed by taking an ordered pair (n, d), also
written as n/d, where n, d ∈ Fp and d 6= 0 [75]. Therefore, using HElib’s ciphertexts a
field of fractions can be defined using two ciphertexts one to hold the numerator, n, and
the other to hold the denominator, d, which will be called QuasiQ . However, due to the
encryption of the plaintext to ciphertexts the QuasiQ objects will be slightly different
from a true field of fractions.
The first thing is that the denominator cannot be guaranteed to not hold a zero value.
This introduces an issue when using encrypted fractions, namely, what happens when
division by zero occurs? There is no way of knowing when performing a division of two
fractions whether the divisor is in fact zero and therefore producing a result that is not
defined. This remains an interesting problem of what should be done or can be done
in this situation. However, since the values of the ratios themselves are not computed
in decimal form, the algorithms will still be carried out regardless of the values. The
results when displayed after decryption however will not be defined as they will have a
zero for the denominator segment of the ratio.
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Another difference is that normally a field of fractions has an equivalence relation
defined (n, d) ∼ (r, s) ⇐⇒ ns = dr where n, d, r, s ∈ Fp and d 6= 0, s 6= 0. The fraction
can be reduced to its lower representation by factoring. However, when encrypted this is
not possible as the values cannot be seen to be factored in the recursion procedure that
would be required. Plus, due to the integral domain used being finite, there is another
equivalence relation imposed on the field of fractions due to the modulus p and this can
cause issues as described in section 5.3 when evaluating the QuasiQ objects as well as
leading to the denominator zero problem described previously.
Defining the QuasiQ object as an ordered pair (n, d), the fraction arithmetic can be
defined as follows: addition operation: (a, b)+(c, d) = (a·d+c·b, b·d), negation operation:
for fraction r = (n, d) we define the additive inverse −r = (−n, d), subtraction operation:
(a, b) − (c, d) = (a · d − c · b, b · d), multiplication operation: (a, b) · (c, d) = (a · c, b · d),
reciprocal: for fraction r = (n, d) we define the multiplicative inverse r−1 = (d, n),
division operation: (a, b)÷ (c, d) = (a · d, b · c).
The ciphertext objects are operated on exactly as they normally would be in HElib,
but for the QuasiQ objects the operations for the field of fractions are implemented,
which include negation, reciprocal, addition, multiplication, as well as, subtraction, and
division. All inputs a, b to the following operations are QuasiQ objects, namely an
ordered pair of two ciphertexts (n, d) where n represents the numerator and d the denom-
inator. The numerator and denominator of a QuasiQ object a can be accessed with
a.numerator and a.denominator respectively.
Before we present the pseudocode, we note that as the underlying types of QuasiQ
objects are ciphertexts, we attempt to use procedures already available within HElib [48]
wherever possible. An instance of this is in the implementation of negation. We use the
HElib operation Ctxt.negate(c) where c is the input ciphertext to be negated and the
output is −c. This is achieved through a scalar multiplication (−1) · c.
The quasi-rational operations are described in the following pseudocode:
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QuasiQ.add(a, b)
1 if a is b then return 2 · a.numerator
2 else
n← b.numerator
3 a.numerator ← a.numerator · b.denominator
4 n← n · a.denominator
5 a.denominator ← a.denominator · b.denominator
6 a.numerator ← a.numerator + n
7 return a
QuasiQ.negate(a)




3 a← QuasiQ.add(a, b)
4 return a
QuasiQ.multiply(a, b)
1 a.numerator ← a.numerator · b.numerator




2 a.numerator ← a.denominator
3 a.denominator ← n
2 return a
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QuasiQ.divide(a, b)
1 if a is b then
a.numerator ← a.numerator · a.denominator
2 a.denominator ← a.numerator
3 else
b← QuasiQ.reciprocal(b)
4 a← QuasiQ.multiply(a, b)
5 return a
The algorithms above which have two inputs, such as QuasiQ.subtract(a, b) for exam-
ple, can be read as calculating the operation a − b, as opposed to calculating b − a,
which would be QuasiQ.subtract(b, a). Subsequently, all of the necessary mathematical
operations between two QuasiQ rationals can be performed, thus our implementation
can be tested by applying it to a known mathematical algorithm.
It is noted, there is an “optimisation” in the operations QuasiQ.divide(a, b) and
QuasiQ.add(a, b), specifically line 1 of the pseudocode “if a is b”. The input QuasiQ
objects a, b in the previously defined pseudocode are pairs of ciphertexts, thus we cannot
tell if the inputs a and b are the same mathematically. Therefore this “optimisation”
only applies for when a and b are the same object in memory (i.e. if we call the method
QuasiQ.divide(a, a)).
5.2.3 Simple Linear Regression
Now that there is the ability to hold data in fractional form, this can be applied to new
problems to be tackled with FHE. One problem of note is linear regression, as rational
numbers can be used to accurately determine the equation of a line given a set of points.
Given a set of coordinates (xi, yi), the desire is to calculate a line of best fit of the form
y = b1x + b0 using simple linear regression. Therefore values must be calculated of the
line intercept b0 and the gradient of the line b1 using least squares. These values are
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obtained via the following:
b1 =
∑n
i=1(xi − x̄)(yi − ȳ)∑n
i=1(xi − x̄)2
, b0 = ȳ − b1x̄,
where x̄ and ȳ are the mean averages of the x′is and y
′
is respectively.
Recall from section 5.2.2 that our QuasiQ object is an ordered pair (n, d) where n
represents the numerator and d the denominator. In this implementation, the values
xi, yi are each encrypted as QuasiQ objects. Since xi and yi are integers, we encode each
xi as a rational of the form xi/1. Similarly we encode the yi values as a rational yi/1. In
other words, the input data xi, yi of our homomorphic regression algorithm are rationals
xi/1 and yi/1 encoded, as QuasiQ objects, into pairs (xi, 1) and (yi, 1) respectively.
These values are used to encode into our fractions, the numerator and the denomi-
nator of the fraction b1, storing these values in their respective locations in the QuasiQ
object before using this value to calculate b0.
5.3 Implementation of Linear Regression
The implementation of the simple linear regression discussed in section 5.2.3 is given
below using the QuasiQ implementation of a field of fractions. The linear regression
algorithm was tested on points of a straight line with added Gaussian noise. Firstly, the
gradient and intercept of a straight line are selected randomly from a uniform distribu-
tion. Then we select points of this line and a random rational number r selected from
a Gaussian distribution is then added to the corresponding y values to obtain a set of
points (xi, yi + ri). The Gaussian distribution is denoted by N (µ, σ2), where µ is the
mean and σ is the standard deviation. The mean that is set for the Gaussian distribu-
tion in our experiments is always zero as our concern is simulating random noise on the
data and not a systematic error. This new set of points is used to simulate a real-world
dataset with a notable correlation. The new x and y values are then encrypted into
ciphertexts and given to the linear regression algorithm to calculate the line of best fit.
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(a) Noise chosen from a Gaussian
Distribution N (0, 1).
(b) Noise chosen from a Gaussian
Distribution N (0, 9).
Figure 5.1: Random noise distribution from two Gaussian distributions.
An example of noise chosen from a relatively small sample set of N (0, 1) containing
64 (xi, yi) values is given in Figure 5.1a. In the experiments shown the xi values are
selected to be at intervals of 0.5, in other words, the x values are selected to be xi =
i
2
for i in the interval [0, 63]. The reason for choosing our data size to be in this range
was to keep the total noise growth to a reasonable level so as to circumvent the need for
bootstrapping.
Most of the noise variables ri are within the interval (−1, 1) with the largest offset
being within the range (−3, 3). This can be viewed as a “noise” vector ~r = (r0, . . . , r63)
that is added to our straight line vector ~y, where yi = mxi + c, to obtain the set of
points in Figure 5.2. The set of xi and corresponding yi + ri values are encrypted
and input to the linear regression algorithm, where the values b0 and b1 are calculated
homomorphically from the linear regression equation previously stated in Section 5.2.3.
However, prior to implementing the full linear regression algorithm, two subroutines are
required to calculate some of the intermediary terms. Namely, an algorithm calcMean to
calculate the mean of a set of given QuasiQ objects, which in turn requires a summation
subroutine sumFrac that sums a set of QuasiQ objects.
Given an ordered collection of QuasiQ objects v, sumFrac(v) computes the sum of
the collection. First we take a copy of the collection as this algorithm is destructive. The
additions are treated as nodes in a binary tree and the same collection is used to store the
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intermediate results so memory usage is minimal. This keeps the depth of operations to a
minimum, dependent only on the collection size to log2 size(w), where w is the collection
of fractions and size(w) is the number of fractions contained in the collection. The final
sum is contained in the first element of the collection which is returned. The sumFrac
procedure is defined below:
sumFrac(v)
1 w ← v
2 e← size(w)
3 s← 1
4 while e > 1 do
5 for i← 0 to size(w) step 2 · s do # iterate through w by jumps of 2 · s
6 if i+ s > size(w)− 1 then break
7 wi ← wi + wi+s
8 if odd(e) = true then e← e+ 1
9 e← e/2
10 s← 2 · s
11 return w0
Once sumFrac is defined, calcMean(v) is relatively simple to implement, where v
is an ordered collection of QuasiQ objects. Now the full linear regression algorithm,
linearReg(x, y), can be implemented to calculate the equations stated in Section 5.2.3,
where x and y are ordered collections of the coordinates (xi, yi) as defined previously,
calcMean(v)
1 m← sumFrac(v)
2 m.denominator ← m.denominator · size(v)
3 return m
Chapter 5. Implementing Fractional Arithmetic in FHE 63





3 for i← 0 to n− 1 do
4 dxi ← xi − xMean
5 dyi ← yi − yMean
6 for i← 0 to n− 1 do
7 ddxi ← dxi · dxi
8 ddyi ← dyi · dxi
9 ddxSum← sumFrac(ddx)
10 ddySum← sumFrac(ddy)
11 b1 ← QuasiQ.divide(ddySum, ddxSum)
12 t← QuasiQ.multiply(xMean, b1)
13 b0 ← QuasiQ.subtract(yMean, t)
14 return b0, b1
The two values b0, b1 are returned by the linearReg as two separate QuasiQ objects,
representing the intercept and gradient of our regression line respectively. The user can
then decrypt these two values and plot the line of best fit y = b0 + b1x, on top of the
noisy data as shown in Figure 5.2.
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After obtaining a graph showing the linear regression algorithm correctly fitting a
line to encrypted noisy data, the variance of the Gaussian distribution used to generate
the noise vector was increased. Setting the standard deviation σ = 3, produces the
noise shown in Figure 5.1b. An issue appeared once the noise was increased that when
generating the points for the line that the additive noise would send those points to the
“wrong” equivalence class in the QuasiQ if the point went beyond the [0, p− 1] interval
in the y-axis in the rationals. This causes a loss of information, as the resulting data
gets allocated to an equivalence class and thus the “true” value is lost within a set of
possible equivalent values.
An interesting problem to consider; however, to make further progress with the prac-
tical investigation we decided to modify the few noisy elements that fell outside the
interval [0, p − 1]. The noise selection process that tackled both the case yi + ri < 0 as
well as yi+ri > p−1. For the case of yi+ri < 0, the new data is forced to have the value
yi + ri = 0. This tends to occur at the smaller xi values as the original yi values start
close to 0 so there is a greater probability of obtaining a noise value |−ri| > yi, where
|−ri| is the absolute value of −ri. Examples of this can be seen in both Figure 5.3 and
Figure 5.4. For the case yi + ri > p− 1, during the noise selection process, only rational
numbers that can be represented using 1 decimal place are considered (note, that using
the smallest precision could have also been used, 1/p − 1). The decimal representation
is converted into the QuasiQ rational representation by multiplying the float by 10 and
then removing the remaining decimal places. Therefore always obtaining a fraction with
a maximum denominator of 10. By doing this, it keeps the starting denominator rela-
tively small compared to our plaintext modulus p to reduce the possibility of creating
a numerator greater than p and thus wrapping around. Thus, as the denominator of
the QuasiQ object increases, the maximum difference from 0 that can be represented
decreases. The most important property of the input data, as in all computing approx-
imations of the rationals, is that it exists within the bounds that accurately represents
the rationals. For QuasiQ , the data must ideally lie with x and y values both in the
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Figure 5.3: Fitting of the regression line on the input data with additive noise from
N (0, 9).
Figure 5.4: Fitting of the regression line on the input data with additive noise from
N (0, 25).
interval [0, p− 1] in the rationals.
Multiple examples have been presented where our algorithm correctly fits a line of best
fit to some randomised encrypted data through simple linear regression. Unfortunately,
it must be noted that occasionally the final outputs b0, b1 appear to give an incorrect line.
Therefore upon initial inspection by the user, it looks like the algorithm has incorrectly
fitted a line to the input data such as in Figure 5.5a. This is due to the fraction in
the rationals being wrong, but in the correct equivalence class in QuasiQ , for reasons
described in more detail in Section 5.4. In other words, the result the user views is the
equivalence class in which the correct answer belongs to in the rationals. So it is possible
to find which element of our equivalence class is the “true” result of the algorithm.
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(a) Initial “incorrect” fitting of
the regression line y = b0 + b1x,
where b1 = n/d.
(b) An equivalent fitting of the
regression line y = b0 + b
′
1x,
where b′1 = (n+ p)/d.
(c) An equivalent fitting of the
regression line y = b0 + b
′′
1x,
where b′′1 = (n+ 2p)/d.
(d) An equivalent fitting of the
regression line y = b0 + b
′′′
1 x,
where b′′′1 = (n+ 3p)/d.
Figure 5.5: Regression lines with gradients belonging to the same equivalence class.
Figure 5.5a shows the line fitted clearly is not aligned with the data. This is due
to the gradient of the line being the fraction within the plaintext space or at least the
representative equivalence class that contains the correct gradient. In other words, the
gradient that was output from the regression algorithm is always of the form 0 ≤ b1 < p,
where p is the plaintext modulus defining the plaintext space Ap. However, the QuasiQ
object b1 is a fraction b1 = n/d, where 0 ≤ n, d < p. Despite this being the b1 value
received, it belongs to the equivalence class b1 mod p. Alternatively, using the Euclidean
division algorithm, given b1 mod p there exists a set of solutions of the form x = k ·p+b1,
for k ∈ Z. This is slightly more complex given we are now dealing with a rational number
b1 = n/d rather than an integer in a sense that the value belongs to the set of rationals
a/b, where a = j · p+ n and b = k · p+ d for j, k ∈ Z.
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(a) Initial “incorrect” fitting of
the regression line y = b0 + b1x,
where b0 = n/d.
(b) An equivalent fitting of the
regression line y = b0 + b
′
1x,
where b′0 = (n+ 3p)/d.
(c) An equivalent fitting of the
regression line y = b0 + b
′′
1x,
where b′′0 = (n+ 6p)/d.
(d) An equivalent fitting of the
regression line y = b0 + b
′′′
1 x,
where b′′′0 = (n+ 9p)/d.
Figure 5.6: Regression lines with intercepts belonging to the same equivalence class.
Since the important information is the ratio between n and d, choosing to keep the
denominator value constant and scanning through the elements of the equivalence class
for the correct rational should obtain the correct value in the rationals. In the case in
Figure 5.5, the denominator d is chosen to be kept constant. The individual graphs
are obtained by incrementing through the gradients b′1 = (n + k · p)/d for k = 0, 1, 2, 3,
where the case k = 0 is the starting line as an initial output. The correct line gradient is
shown in Figure 5.5c and the line of best fit that was calculated by the linear regression
algorithm. The same issue can happen to the intercept b0 as well. An example of this is
shown in Figure 5.6.
Moreover, the final case may be that neither the intercept b0 nor the gradient b1 have
the correct rational representation when decoded. As a result, obtaining the correct
Chapter 5. Implementing Fractional Arithmetic in FHE 68
rational values for the line of best fit can be challenging as there are many possible
combinations that will need to be compared. In practice for simple linear regression
it is not expected that wrap-around should occur very often during the computation,
so scanning through the set of the equivalence class for the correct rational should be
relatively quick for small k. However, for other algorithms this may not be the case.
5.4 Evaluation of the use of QuasiQs
It has been successfully shown that it is possible to not only represent fractions using
an FHE scheme but also compute on such data as well. However, there are a number of
new limitations, not present in previous solutions, which our solution introduces.
Arguably, the most significant limitation of this scheme is due to building a field frac-
tions from a finite integral domain which has implications of representing the rationals,
Q. Because of the way the fractions are constructed from a finite domain, there will be
rationals that are not present in an equivalence class. This is trivially seen by looking









: u, t ∈ Z;n, d ∈ Zp; d 6= 0 and p is prime
}
.
Since d 6= 0, it means that there is a set that is given when d is zero that is not included
in the finite fractions. This is a problem because there are rational numbers that are
not members of one of the equivalence classes. As these rational numbers do not exist
in our field of fractions, attempting to perform operations with such rational numbers
can yield somewhat unexpected results. This unfortunately is not a scenario that is easy
to avoid when using the BGV scheme to compute using our QuasiQ objects. Detection
when a denominator becomes 0 while the data is encrypted is not possible. This can be
avoided at encoding of rationals by making sure that the n and d values being encoded
are in the bounds [0, p − 1] and [1, p − 1] respectively. However, during computation
wrap-around could occur sending d to zero and will not be noticed until the final result
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from the algorithm is decrypted by the user and they realise the answer is not correct.
Another issue due to the fractions being encrypted, the values cannot be observed.
This is necessary for security, but has an undesired effect because in the field of fractions
there is supposed to be an equivalence relation defined as discussed in Section 4.3. As
a result of this, when performing an operation between two QuasiQ objects, a fraction
may be obtained where the numerator and denominator have common factors. However,
not being able to see the encrypted values, there is no way of knowing whether the
result can be simplified as well as the factor in which the fraction can be simplified by.
Therefore as operations are performed upon the data, the values of both the numerator
and denominator increase relatively quickly and thus increases the chance of obtaining
values which wrap around due to becoming larger than the plaintext modulus p. As a
result of this, the scheme currently requires the use of extremely large values of p which
is not a preferable parameter selection.
Moreover, another issue when using QuasiQ numbers is the unfortunate increase in
the computation complexity of performing addition in the field of fractions. Namely,
given two fractions ab and
c
d , the resulting sum of the two fractions is
ad+bc
bd . Computa-
tionally this requires us to compute three multiplications as well as an addition, which
may not be too computationally costly in the plaintext domain but in the encrypted
domain is an undesired implication of our form of representation. A normal homomor-
phic addition under the BGV scheme is not computationally expensive in terms of the
amount of ciphertext noise it produces and thus usually more than one addition can be
performed before a level needs to be consumed in order to reduce the ciphertext noise
level. However, when performing an addition operation in a field of fractions, three
homomorphic multiplications as well as the single addition are required. Moreover, due
to multiplications having a greater impact on the ciphertext noise increase, it results
in the approximate consumption of three levels each time that an addition operation
is performed. This worsens how algorithms scale between the plaintext and encrypted
domain. Performing simple linear regression on a set of 64 data points was empirically
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found to consume roughly 20 levels when using a plaintext prime p = 1009. Thus, for
larger data sets it is highly likely that bootstrapping may be required to perform the
algorithm.
However, despite the QuasiQ representation being more computationally expensive
in terms of additions it is more efficient at computing the multiplicative inverse. Since
the plaintext modulus p is always chosen to be prime, Zp is a field and thus the field of
fractions is itself Zp. Therefore the reason for choosing one representation over the other
needs to be considered. Given an element c ∈ Zp, obtaining the multiplicative inverse
c−1 is computationally expensive as it involves using Fermat’s Little Theorem to obtain
cp−2 ≡ c−1 mod p [40, 44] and therefore many multiplications. Given a QuasiQ object
(n, d) it is notably less expensive to compute the inverse as it involves swapping the two
elements of the ordered pair to produce (d, n); albeit swapping two pointers.
Although there are limitations, such as the inability to simplify fractions while they
are encrypted to mitigate the rapid increase of the numerator or denominator and limit-
ing the chance for wrap-around to occur, there are possible future solutions to consider.
In the case of simplification, one could possibly implement a method which computes
the inverse of 2 in Ap. Then after an arbitrary number of operations throughout the
algorithm, an intermediary step can be performed to multiply both the numerator and
denominator by the inverse of 2. This would be dividing both the numerator and denom-
inator by 2 which is equivalent to multiplying by 1, the identity. As the algorithm is
performed, a counter can record the number of occurrences of this operation and when
the user decrypts the final result, the correct answer can be reconstructed by multiplying
the result by the correct power of 2.
5.5 Comparison with Previous Methods
Comparing our solution with previous attempts at approximating real numbers, it is
evident that our method removes the problem of added bookkeeping when it comes
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to keeping track of the scale in solutions using fixed scalar multipliers [51, 18, 23, 19,
8]. These previous solutions use a fixed scalar multiplier to map rationals to integers,
however it is important to keep track of this scalar in order ensure the output is decoded
correctly from an integer to a rational. Our solution mitigates this as we keep the ratio
as a QuasiQ object, thus adding no extra complexity to the decoding step.
Due to the use of a polynomial for the plaintext modulus as opposed to a prime
number p, [19] introduces a notable algorithmic overhead to the decryption phase. Our
solution does not introduce any overhead to the encryption and decryption phase as
we use standard ciphertext objects to represent both our numerator and denominator.
Despite doubling the memory usage, the numerator and denominator can be computed
in parallel, thus the computational overhead of encrypting and decrypting a pair of
ciphertexts will be minimal.
We found that similar to previous solutions, we tend to require larger values of p,
however, unlike [51, 18, 23, 19, 8], this is due to the lack of fraction simplification which
described in section 5.4. Previous solutions required larger values of p due to an increased
noise growth. Our solution results in an increased noise growth only during the addition
of two QuasiQ objects but not for other operations.
Due to our solution removing the extra bookkeeping of most previous solutions in
the literature, it makes our solution conceptually simpler when compared to the existing
literature. However it introduces an undesired computational overhead to rational addi-
tions. Thus our solution is computationally more expensive when used for algorithms
containing a large number of multiplications. Unlike previous solutions, our proposed
method makes computing the reciprocal free in terms of homomorphic operations, thus
division is as computationally expensive as multiplication.
The method we propose is conceptually similar to [72] which uses the Gentry-Sahai-
Waters (GSW) scheme [41]. Since our method uses the BGV scheme [14], we use vector
additions and multiplications as opposed to matrix multiplications and additions, thus
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making our method less computationally expensive.
5.6 Conclusion
The ability to preform analytics in FHE is an important area of study and no one solution
has yet gained dominance. In this chapter, we have shown that a field of fractions can
naturally be constructed from the plaintext space algebra from the BGV scheme. The
practical implementation that we call QuasiQ has some limitations as opposed to an
actual field of fractions due to the encryption.
As an approximation to the rationals, the QuasiQ objects can be put to use for analyt-
ics. This has been demonstrated with a practical example use case, namely, performing
simple linear regression, implemented in FHE, upon simple generated noisy data. This
opens the possibility for performing more complex algorithms in the encrypted domain
with QuasiQ objects. There are some inherent limitations that a finite field of fractions
have to represent the rationals; due to being a subfield, the “wrong” fraction can be given
when decoding back to the rationals. A correction method for this has been described,
something which is not possible with other alternative methods in the literature. How-
ever, the limitations are similar to other current solutions that have been proposed in
the literature being limited to a bounded space and having a minimum precision and the
operations between QuasiQ objects are simple to implement, only requiring the basic
ciphertext operations. Therefore, this is a viable alternative option to perform analytics




Subsequent to exploring the feasibility of applying FHE to a networking environment as
well as to represent rational numbers, there is another key component of FHE that is
yet to be explored. Namely the feasibility of using FHE to compute complex functions
that are infeasible to compute using the somewhat homomorphic variant. This section
describes my experience in building a logistic regression model that worked on genomic
data within an FHE environment. This project was initially aimed to solve a real-world
problem proposed by the iDASH centre [50].
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Somewhat vs. Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Though only a theoretical plausibility result at first, the last decade saw major algorith-
mic improvements in FHE schemes, resulting in many research prototypes that imple-
ment this technology (e.g., [45, 36, 18, 24]) and attempt to use it in different settings
(e.g., [7, 42, 54, 29, 43, 56], among others).
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Nearly all contemporary FHE schemes come in two variants: The basic underlying
scheme is somewhat homomorphic (SWHE), where the parameters are set depending
on the complexity of the required homomorphic operations, and the resulting instance
can only support computations up to that complexity. The reason is that ciphertexts
are noisy, with the noise growing throughout the computation, and once the noise
grows beyond some (parameter-dependent) threshold the ciphertext can no longer be
decrypted. This can be solved using Gentry’s bootstrapping technique (at the cost of
relying on circular security). In this technique the scheme is augmented with a recryption
operation to refresh the ciphertext and reduce its noise level. The augmented scheme
is thus fully homomorphic (FHE), meaning that a single instance with fixed parameters
can handle arbitrary computations. But FHE is expensive, as the computation must be
peppered with expensive recryption operations. So, it is often cheaper to settle for a
SWHE scheme with larger parameters (that admit larger noise) as in the previous two
cases proposed in Chapter 4 and 5.
Indeed, with very few exceptions, almost all prior attempts at practical use of FHE
used only the SWHE variant, fixing the target computation and then choosing parame-
ters that can handle that computation and no more. But SWHE has its limits: as the
complexity of the function grows, the SWHE parameters become prohibitively large. In
this work, we set out to investigate the practical feasibility of “deep FHE”, attempting
to answer the fundamental question of FHE’s usefulness in practice:
Can FHE realistically be used for complex functions?
It is noted that the term recryption will be used interchangeably with bootstrapping
as this is the name used for HElib’s [48] implementation of bootstrapping and is not to
be confused with the term re-encryption.
6.1.2 The iDASH Competition
Over the last few years, competitions by the iDASH center [50] provided a good source
of “real world problems” to grind our teeth on. iDASH promotes privacy-preserving
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approaches to analysis of medical data, and since 2014 they have organized yearly com-
petitions where they present specific problems in this area and ask for solutions using
technologies such as differential privacy, secure multi-party computation, and homomor-
phic encryption.
In the homomorphic-encryption track of the 2017 competition, the problem to be
solved was to compute homomorphically the parameters of a logistic-regression model,
given encrypted data. The data consists of records of the form (~x, y), where ~x ∈ {0, 1}d
is a vector of d bits, with each bit xi representing an attribute of an individual (e.g.,
man or woman, over 40 or not, high blood pressure or not, etc.), and y ∈ {0, 1} is the
target attribute that we investigate (e.g., whether or not they have a heart disease).
A logistic-regression model tries to predict the probability of y = 1 given a particular
value of ~x, postulating that the probability p~x
def
= Pr[y = 1|~x] can be expressed as
p~x = 1/(1 + exp(−w0 − 〈~x, ~w′〉)) for some fixed vector of weights ~w = (w0, ~w′) ∈ Rd+1.
(The term w0 is typically called an “offset”.) Given sample data consisting of n records,
our task is to find the weight vector ~w ∈ Rd+1 that best approximates the empirical
probabilities (e.g., in the sense of maximum likelihood). For a more detailed exposition
see Section 6.2.
In addition to presenting the problem, the iDASH organizers also provided some
sample data on which to test our procedures. The data consisted of nearly 1600 records
of genomic data, each with 105 attributes (but they also accepted solutions that could
only handle much fewer attributes than this). With so many attributes, this appears
firmly outside the scope of SWHE1, hence we set out to design a solution to the iDASH
task using FHE.2
1Some entries in the iDASH competition, including the winner, found clever ways to use SWHE for
this problem, albeit only for a much smaller number of attributes. See for example [56].
2Unfortunately, our solution was not ready in time for the iDASH competition deadline, so we ended
up not participating in the formal competition.
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6.1.3 Our Logistic-Regression Procedure
The starting point for our solution is a closed-form formula that we developed for approx-
imating the logistic-regression parameters. This formula, developed in Section 6.2 below,
involved partitioning the records into “buckets”, one per value of ~x ∈ {0, 1}d, then count-
ing the numbers of y = 1 and y = 0 in each bucket. These bucket counters are then
used to derive a linear system A~w = ~b whose solution is the vector of weights ~w that
we seek. As explained in Section 6.2, computing A,~b from the bucket counters involve
complicated functions such as rational inversion and the natural logarithm.
The first issue that we have to deal with, is that our approximation formula only
yields valid results in settings where the number of records n far exceeds the number of
attributes d. Specifically, it relies on the fraction of y = 1 records in each bucket ~x to
roughly approximate p~x, so in particular we must have n  2d to ensure that we have
sufficiently many records in each bucket. But we aim at a setting with d > 100, which
is far outside the validity region of this approximation formula.
We thus added to our solution a “quick-n-dirty” pre-processing phase, in which we
homomorphically extract from the d input attributes a set of k  d attributes which
are likely to be the most relevant ones, then apply the approximation formula only to
these k attributes, and set wj := 0 for all the others. Specifically, in our solution we
used k = 5, since the sample iDASH data had very few attributes with significant wj
coefficients.
This quick-n-dirty procedure involves computing the correlation between each column
(attribute) xj and the target attribute y, this is essentially just computing linear func-
tions. Then we find the indexes j1, . . . , jk of the k columns xj that are most correlated
with y, and extract only these columns from all the records. The high-level structure of
our homomorphic procedure is therefore:
1. For each column j, compute Corrj = |Correlation(xj , y)|;
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2. Compute j1, . . . , jk, the indexes of the k columns with largest Corrj values;
3. Extract the k columns j1, . . . , jk, setting
~x′i[1 . . . k] := (~xi[j1], . . . ~xi[jk]);
4. Compute the bucket counters, for every ~x ∈ {0, 1}k set
Y~x :=
∣∣∣{i ≤ N : ~x′i = ~x and yi = 1}∣∣∣ ,
N~x :=
∣∣∣{i ≤ N : ~x′i = ~x and yi = 0}∣∣∣ .
5. Compute A ∈ R(k+1)×(k+1) and ~b ∈ Rk+1 from the Y~x’s and N~x’s.
6. Solve the system A~w′ = ~b for ~w′ ∈ Rk+1, then output the coefficients w0 := w′0,
wji := w
′
i for the columns j1, . . . , jk, and wj := 0 for all other columns j.
Jumping ahead, about 55% of the computation time is spent in the first “quick-n-dirty”
phase, which is the only part of the computation that manipulates homomorphically the
entire input dataset.
6.1.4 Homomorphic Computation of the Approximation Procedure
We used the HElib library [48] as our back end to evaluate our approximation procedure
homomorphically. Devising a homomorphic computation of this procedure brings up
many challenges. Here we briefly discuss some of them.
Implementing complex functions. Obtaining the linear system A,~b from the bucket
counters Y~x, N~x involves computing functions such as rational division, or the natural log-
arithm. Computing these functions homomorphically, we have two potential approaches:
one is to try to approximate them by low-degree polynomials (e.g., using their Taylor
expansion), and the other to pre-compute them in a table and rely on homomorphic
table lookup.
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In this work we opted for the second approach, which is faster and shallower when
applicable, but it can only be used to get a low-precision approximation of these func-
tions. In our solution we used six or seven bits of precision, see more details in Section 6.4.
Homomorphic binary arithmetic and comparisons. Other things that we needed
were the usual addition and multiplications operations, but applied to integers in binary
representation (i.e., using encryption of the individual bits). Somewhat surprisingly,
these basic operations were not discussed much in the literature, not in terms of proper
implementations. Computing them homomorphically is mostly a matter of implement-
ing textbook routines (e.g., carry look ahead for addition). But in this context we are
extremely sensitive to the computation depth, which is not typical in other implementa-
tions. We describe our implementation of these methods and their various optimizations
in Section 6.5.
Deciding on the plaintext space. HElib supports working with different plaintext-
space moduli, and different calculations are easier with different moduli. In particular,
the correlation computation in the first step is much easier when using a large plaintext
space, as this lets us treat it as a linear operation over the native plaintext space. But
most other operations above are easier when working with bits.
Here we use some features of the recryption implementation in HElib: When set to
recrypt a ciphertext whose plaintext space is modulo 2, HElib uses temporary ciphertexts
with plaintext space modulo 2e for some e > 2 (usually e = 7 or e = 8). In particular it
means that HElib can support computation with varying plaintext spaces of the form 2e,
and it also supports switching back and forth between them.
In our procedure, we used a mod-211 plaintext space for computing the initial corre-
lation, then switched to mod-2 plaintext space for everything else.
Setting the parameters. Setting the various parameters for bootstrapping is some-
what of an art form, involving many trade-offs. In our implementation we settled for
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using the m-th cyclotomic ring with m = 215− 1, corresponding to lattices of dimension
φ(m) = 27000. We set the number of levels in the BGV moduli-chain so that at the end
of recryption we will still have nine more levels to use. Recryption itself for this value
of m takes 20 levels, so we need a total of 29 levels. This means that we used a maximum
ciphertext modulus q of size roughly 1030 bits, yielding a security level of just over 80
bits.
Solving linear systems. The last step in the approximation procedure above is to
solve a linear system over the rational numbers. Performing this step homomorphically
(with good numerical stability) is a daunting task. We considered some “pivot free”
methods of doing it, but none of them seemed like it would be a good solution to what
we need.
Since this is the last step of the computation, one option is to implement instead
a randomized encoding of this step, which may be easier to compute. We discuss that
option in Section 6.6, in particular describing randomized encoding of the linear-system-
solver function, that may be new. However we did not implement that scheme in our
solution, instead we settled for a leaky solution that simply sends the linear system to
be decrypted and solved in the clear.
6.1.5 The End Result
We implemented homomorphically all aspects of the procedure above, except the final
linear-system solver. The program takes a little over four and a half hours on a single
core to process the dataset of about 1600 encrypted records and 105 attributes. Over
two and a half hours of this time is spent on extracting the five most relevant columns,
about 45 minutes are spent on computing the bucket counters, and the remaining hour
and 15 minutes is spent computing A and ~b from these counters. We can use more cores
to reduce this time, down to just under one hour when using 16 cores. See more details
in Section 6.7. In terms of accuracy, our solution yields “area under curve” (AUC) of
about 0.65 on the given dataset, which is in line with other solutions that were submitted
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to the iDASH competition.
6.1.6 Related Work
Surprisingly, not much can be found in the literature about general-purpose homomor-
phic implementation of basic binary operations. The first work that we found addressing
this issue is by Cheon et al. [21], where they describe several optimizations for binary
comparison and addition, in a setting where we can spread the bits of each integer among
multiple plaintext slots of a ciphertext. They show procedures that use fewer multipli-
cation operations, but require more rotations. These optimizations are very useful in
settings where you can ensure that the bits are arranged in the right slots to begin with.
But in our setting, we use these operations as a general-purpose tool, working on the
result of previous computation. In this setting, the need for many rotations will typically
negate the gains from saving on the number of multiplications. We thus decided to stick
to bit-slice implementation throughout our solution, and try to make them use as few
operations (and as small depth) as possible.
Other relevant works on homomorphic binary arithmetic are due to Xu et al. [77] and
Chen et al. [20], who worked in the same bitslice model as us and used similar techniques.
But they only provided partially optimized solutions, requiring deeper circuits and more
multiplications than we use. (For example, they only used a size-4 carry-lookahead-adder
for addition, and did not use the three-for-two procedure for multiplication.)
In terms of applying homomorphic encryption to the problem of logistic regression,
the work of Aono et al. [2] described an interactive secure computation protocol for
computing logistic regression, using additively-homomorphic encryption. Mohassel and
Zhang [63] also described related secure-MPC protocols (but using garbled circuits, not
HE). Wang et al described in [76] a system called HEALER that can compute homomor-
phically an exact logistic-regression model, but (essentially) only with a single attribute
and only with very small number of records (up to 30).
A lot more work on the subject was done as part of the iDASH competition in 2017,
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but the only public report that we found on it is that of Kim et al. [56]. In this
report they describe their implementation, using the somewhat-homomorphic scheme
for approximate numbers due to Cheon et al. [22] to implement a homomorphic approx-
imation of logistic regression (with a small number of attributes) using gradient-descent
methods.
6.1.7 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2 we derive our closed-form
approximation formula for logistic regression. Then in Section 6.3 we provide a bird-
eye view of our solution, describing the individual steps and explaining how they are
implemented. In Sections 6.4-6.5 we describe many of the toolboxes that we developed
and used as subroutines in this solution, and in Section 6.7 we give performance results
of our implementation. Our randomized encoding for the linear-system solver over the
rational numbers in developed in Section 6.6, and we conclude with a short discussion
in Section 6.8.
6.2 Logistic Regression and Our Approximation
Logistic regression is a technique to model dependence between related attributes. The
input consists of n records (rows), each with d+ 1 attributes (columns), all of the form
(~xi, yi) with ~xi ∈ {0, 1}d and yi ∈ {0, 1}. Below we sometimes refer to a fixed value
~c ∈ {0, 1}d as a category. (We sometimes also refer to the different values ~c ∈ {0, 1}d as
“buckets”.) The ultimate goal is to estimate the probability p~x = Pr[y = 1|~x]. Logistic













for some fixed vector of weights ~w ∈ Rd+1. The goal of logistic regression, given all
the records {(~xi, yi)}ni=1, is to find the vector ~w that best matches this data. Below we
denote ~x′
def
= (1|~x), and we use the expression for p~x as a function of ~w ∈ Rd+1, namely






1 + exp(−〈~x′, ~w〉)
=
exp(〈~x′, ~w〉)
1 + exp(〈~x′, ~w〉)
. (6.1)
For a candidate weight-vector ~w and some given record (~x, y), the model probability of
seeing this outcome y for the attributes ~x is denoted
P~x,y(~w)
def
= {1− p~x(~w) if y = 0, p~x(~w) if y = 1}. If we assume that the records are
independent and use maximum-likelihood as our notion of “best match”, then the goal









6.2.1 A Closed-Form Approximation Formula for Logistic Regression
To get our approximation formula for logistic regression, we partition the data into the
2d “categories” ~c ∈ {0, 1}d. For each category ~c, we denote the number of records in that
category by n~c, the number of records in that category with y = 1 by Y~c, and the number
of records with y = 0 by N~c = n~c − Y~c (‘Y ’ and ‘N ’ for YES and NO, respectively). We







Y~c · ln(p~c(~w)) +N~c · ln(1− p~c(~w)).

































Fix some category ~c ∈ {0, 1}d, and consider the term corresponding to ~c in the sum
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To develop our closed-form formula, we approximate fY,N (·) using Taylor expansion
around its maximum point r0 = ln(Y/N),










(We discuss the validity of this approximation later in this section.) Recall that we are
seeking the weight-vector ~w that maximizes Eqn. (6.2), and hence we can ignore the
someConstant (as well as the 1/2 factor in Y N2(Y+N)) since these do not depend on ~w.




















〈~c′, ~w〉 − L~c
)2}
.
We continue by expressing the last expression in matrix form. Let ~V , ~L be 2d-dimensional
column vectors consisting of all the V~c’s and L~c’s, respectively. Also let Cd be a (d+1)×2d
0-1 matrix whose columns are all the ~c′ vectors (namely the m’th column is (1|bin(m))t).
For example for d = 3 we have
C3 =

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

. (6.4)
















CTd ~w − ~L
)
.
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Cd × diag(~V )× CTd
)−1
× Cd × diag(~V )× ~L.
This finally gives us our closed-form approximation formula: Given all the records (~xi, yi)
we compute all the YES and NO counters for the different categories, Y~c and N~c, then
set V~c := Y~cN~c/(Y~c +N~c) and L~c := ln(Y~c/N~c).
We then let D be the 2d-by-2d diagonal matrix with the V~c’s on the diagonal and




−1 × Cd ~U .
6.2.2 Validity of the Approximation
It is clear that the approximation procedure above relies on the number of records being
sufficiently larger than the number of categories, so that we have enough YES and NO
instances in each category. (Indeed if any Y~c or N~c is zero then the value L~c becomes
undefined.)
Below we therefore assume that the number of records in each category is very large
(i.e., tends to infinity). This implies by the law of large numbers that Y~c and N~c (now
considered as random variables) can be approximated by normal random variables. In
particular they tend to their expected value p~c · n~c and (1− p~c) · n~c, and their log ratio
R~c := ln(Y~c/N~c) tends to ln(p~c/(1 − p~c)). Turning that around, it means that we
expect r~c = ln(p~c/(1− p~c)) to be close to its observed value ln(Y~c/N~c), and therefore the
formula from Eqn. (6.3) using the Taylor expansion of f(r) around ln(Y~c/N~c) should be a
good approximation. The remaining terms in the Taylor expansion represent a residual
contribution that is not explained by the model.
Remark 1. In situations where the system is over-determined, it is possible for the
model to spline the data. One way to reduce the impact of this over-fitting is to include
an ad hoc penalty to the likelihood against the variance in β. Commonly applied penalty
Chapter 6. Performing Logistic Regression using FHE 85
functions include linear L1, and quadratic L2 forms. However, it should also be recog-
nized that such penalty functions do not represent sampling variation that the binomial
and multinomial distributions seek to capture when sampled from disease/exposure pj ’s.
Remark 2. In the expansion, genotypes {0, 1, 2} and other similar constructions are
easily accommodated by the approximation.
6.3 Overview of Our Solution
Expanding on the description from Section 6.1.3, we now explain our approximate
logistic-regression procedure in more detail. We begin in Section 6.3.1 with a description
of the various functions that we want to compute, then in Section 6.3.2 we describe (still
on a high level) how we implement these functions homomorphically.
6.3.1 The procedure that we implement
Input & Output. The input consists of (the encryption of) n records (~xi, yi)
n
i=1, with
~xi ∈ {0, 1}d and yi ∈ {0, 1}. Below we view the input as an n-by-d binary matrix X
with the i’th row equal to ~xi, and a column vector ~y ∈ {0, 1}n containing the yi’s. The
output should be a logistic regression model, consisting of d + 1 real-valued weights
w0, w1, . . . , wd.
Extracting Significant Columns. We begin by considering each column of X sepa-
rately, extracting the the k columns that have the strongest correlation with the target
vector ~y. Below we use HW(~v) to denote the Hamming weight of ~v, and denote by X|j
the j’th column of X. We compute the following quantities:
• Let Y := HW(~y), i.e., the number of records with yi = 1;
• For j = 1, . . . , d, let αj := HW(X|j), i.e., count the records with ~xi[j] = 1;
• For j = 1, . . . , d, let βj := HW(X|j ∧ ~y), i.e., records with ~xi[j] = yi = 1;
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• For j = 1, . . . , d, let Corrj := |n · βj − Y · αj |, i.e., the correlation magnitude
between ~y and X|j .
Then we redact the input records, keeping only the k attributes with the strongest
correlation to y. Namely we extract from X the submatrix X ′ ∈ {0, 1}n×k, consisting
of the k columns with the largest values of Corrj . In our implementation we used in
particular k = 5. Let j1, . . . , jk be the indexes of the selected columns, and denote by
(~x′i, yi)
n
i=1 the n redacted records, i.e., the rows of (X
′|~y).
Computing category counters, variance, and log-ratio. We accumulate the
redacted records in 2k buckets according to their ~x′i values. For each category ~c ∈ {0, 1}k,
we compute Y~c, N~c as the number of records in that category with y = 1, y = 0, respec-
tively,
Y~c :=
∣∣∣{(~x′i, yi) : ~x′i = ~c, yi = 1}∣∣∣ , N~c := ∣∣∣{(~x′i, yi) : ~x′i = ~c, yi = 0}∣∣∣ .





Setting up the linear system. We now arrange the V~c’s and L~c’s in vectors ~V , ~L:
For any m = 0, 1, . . . , 2k − 1, let bin(m) ∈ {0, 1}k be the binary expansion of m, we set
the m’th entry in ~V to Vbin(m), and the m’th entry in ~L to Lbin(m). Next we compute
the coefficients of a linear system from the vectors ~L, ~V as follows:
The matrix A. Let Ck be a fixed (k + 1) × 2k binary matrix, whose m’th column is
(1|bin(m))T . An example for k = 3 is illustrated in Eqn. (6.4). We compute a real
(k + 1)× (k + 1) matrix A := Ck × diag(~V )× CkT (over R), where diag(V ) is the
diagonal matrix with ~V on the diagonal.
The vector ~b. Let ~U be an entry-wise product of ~V and ~L, i.e., Um := Vm · Lm for all
m ∈ [2k]. We compute the real (k + 1)-vector ~b := Ck × ~U .
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Computing the output. Finally, we solve the linear system A~w′ = ~b (over R) for
~w′ ∈ Rk+1, then set the output vector ~w ∈ Rd+1 as follows:
• The offset is w0 := w′0;
• For the selected columns j1, . . . , jk we set wj` := w′`;
• For all other columns we set wj := 0.
6.3.2 Homomorphic Evaluation
We now proceed to give more details on the various steps we used for homomorphic
evaluation of the functions above. The description below is still a high-level one, with
many of the details deferred to later sections. In particular, this implementation relied
on many lower-level tools for homomorphic evaluation of binary arithmetic and binary
comparisons that will be described in Section 6.5, homomorphic table lookup in binary
representation that will be described in Section 6.4, and more.
6.3.2.1 Parameters and plaintext space
For our native plaintext space we use the cyclotomic ring Z[X]/(Φm(X), 211), with m =
32767 (so φ(m) = 27000). This native plaintext space yields 1800 plaintext slots, each
holding an element of Z[x]/(F (X), 211) for some degree-15 polynomial F (X), irreducible
modulo 211. (In other words, each slot contains the Hensel lifting of GF (215) to a mod-211
ring.)
We stress that HElib includes operations for extracting the bits of an encrypted
integer in a mod-2t plaintext space, so we can always switch to bit operations when
needed. The only limitation is that it roughly takes depth t to extract t bits, and we
can only use bootstrapping once we have encryption of individual bits. We therefore
must ensure that we always have enough homomorphic capacity left to extract the bits
of whatever integers we are manipulating.
These 1800 slots are arranged in a 30 × 6 × 10 hypercube, corresponding to the
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generators g1 = 11628 ∈ Z∗m/(2) of order 30, g2 = 28087 ∈ Z∗m/(2, g1) of order 6, and
g3 = 25824 ∈ Z∗m/(2, g1, g2) of order 10.
We note that due to limitations of the BGV encryption scheme that we use, we cannot
realistically use a larger plaintext space. Using a large plaintext modulus adds to the
noise of operations in the scheme, and above 211 this added noise becomes too hard to
deal with. In fact a better optimized implementation would have used a smaller plaintext
space of perhaps 28 rather than 211. This would make computing the correlation a little
harder, but would reduce the noise everywhere else.
6.3.2.2 Encrypting the input
As we said in the introduction, computing the correlation is much simpler when work-
ing with a large plaintext space, but for other operations it is easier to work with bit
representation. We therefore encrypt the input more than one way, as follows:
• We keep two mod-211 ciphertexts as accumulators for the α and β counters, and
a few other ciphertexts for packing the raw data itself. Initially all the ciphertexts
are initialized to zero. The number of the raw-data ciphertexts depends on the
number of records in the dataset: The packing scheme that we use allows each
raw-data ciphertext to hold up to 150 records, and we “fill” these ciphertexts one
at a time until we encrypt all the records.
• Given a record (~xi, yi), we pack the bits in the next available raw-data ciphertext,
using a packing scheme that considers the 27000 coefficients in the native plaintext
space as arranged in a 180× 150 = (30× 6)× (10× 15) matrix. The j’th attribute
in the record is then stored in the coefficient with index (j, i) in this matrix.
In even more detail, let us consider the d+ 1 vector ~zi = (yi|~xi) (where we assume
that d < 180), and the bits of this record will be stored in the raw-data ciphertext
of index i div 150. We let i′ = i mod 150, i1 := i
′ mod 15 and i2 := i
′ div 15, and
for every j = 0, 1, . . . , d we also also let j1 := j mod 6 and j2 := j div 6. Then
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the bit ~zi[j] is stored in the slot of index (j1, j2, i2) in the hypercube, in the i1’st
coefficient. To encrypt this record we prepare a fresh ciphertext that encrypts all
the bits from ~zi in the order above (and is otherwise empty), and homomorphically
add it to the appropriate raw-data ciphertext.
Then, we also add the bits ~xi[j] and yi · ~xi[j] to the accumulator ciphertexts α and
β. Again we prepare a fresh ciphertext that has each bit ~xi[j] in the j’th slot (and
zero elsewhere) and add it homomorphically to the α, accumulator, and similarly
we homomorphically add to the β accumulator a fresh ciphertext with yi · ~xi[j] in
the j’th slot (and zero elsewhere).
6.3.2.3 Computing the correlation
Once we have encrypted all the records, we have in the α, β ciphertexts all the counters
αj , βj (which we assume are sufficiently smaller than the plaintext-space modulus 2
11).
We also assume that we are given in the clear (a good approximation of) the value Y , i.e.
the number of records with yi = 1.
3 Similarly we know in the clear the number of records
n, so we would like to just compute homomorphically the linear combination nβY α.
Unfortunately our plaintext space is not large enough for this computation, as we expect
the result to exceed 211. Instead, what we do is use a low-resolution approximation of
n, Y , namely we compute the correlation values as
Ecorr = dn/Sc β  dY/Sc α
for an appropriate scaling factor S, chosen just large enough so we can expect the result
to fit in 11 bits.
An alternative implementation (that we did not try) is to use sub-sampling. Namely
instead of adding all the record data into the accumulators α, β, we can sub-sample (say)
only 1/8 of the records to add. This would give us three more bits, and we can even trade
3This is a valid assumption in the context of medical studies, since the fraction of YES records in the
overall population is always given in “Table 1” in such studies.
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it off with the amount of precision in n and Y (i.e., make the scaling factor S smaller as
we sub-sample less records). Yet another option would have been to extract the bits of
all the integers in α, β and perform the computation using bit operations, bypassing the
plaintext-space issue altogether.
Once we have the Ecorr ciphertext, we extract the bits to get ciphertexts Ecorr1,Ecorr2,
Ecorr3, . . ., where Ecorri encrypts the i’th bit of all the correlation numbers (represented
as signed integers in 2’s-complement). I.e., the j’th slot in Ecorri encrypts the i’th bit of
the number Corrj .
Computing the absolute value. Once we have the bits of the Corrj ’s, we need to
compute their absolute value. Here we simplify things by computing the 1’s-complement
absolute value (rather than 2’s-complement). Namely, for a signed integer in binary
representation x = xtxt−1 . . . x0, we will set x
′
i = xi ⊕ xt (i ≤ t − 1). Note that this
introduces an error if x < 0 (since we now have x′ = −x− 1 rather than x′ = −x). But
we assume that the significant columns have much stronger correlation than the others,
so a ±1 error should not make a difference.
6.3.2.4 Finding the k most correlated columns
We now come to the most expensive part of our procedure, where we find the indexes of
the k columns with largest correlation magnitude.
We note that the correlation computations above were done on packed ciphertexts,
in a SIMD manner. This means that we now have a few ciphertexts (one for each bit
of precision), with the i’th bit of |Corrj | stored in the j’th slot of the i’th ciphertext.
We therefore find the top few values by a shift-and-MUX procedure, using a binary
comparison subroutine:
• Let ~C be the vector of values that we have, we compare point-wise ~C to ~C  `/2
(where ` is the number of slots), homomorphically computing in each slot j ≤ `/2
a bit bj which is zero if Cj < Cj`/2 and one otherwise. Then we set
~C ′ := ~b (~C 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`/2) + (1 ~b)  ~C.
• Then we repeat the process with shifting by `/4, etc. After log(`) such steps we
have transformed the vector into a heap with the MAX value at the root (which
is at slot 0).
We then zero-out the MAX value at slot 0, and repeat the process to get the 2nd-
largest value, then the 3rd-largest value, etc. After running this procedure k times,
we have our k largest values.
We remark that this procedure that we implemented does not take any advantage
of the fact that after finding the largest value we have the values in a heap rather
than in arbitrary ordering. But note that in our SIMD environment we only need
log(`) operations to extract the next largest value, the same as extracting a value
from a heap. We do not know if there is a SIMD solution that uses less than log `
operations per extracted value.
• As described above, this procedure gives the k largest Corrj values, but our goal
here is to compute the argmax, namely the indexes of these k largest values.
To that end, we pack the indexes in the same order as we do the values. Namely we
keep another ciphertext that packs the index j in the same slot that Ecorr packs the
value Corrj . Then we perform the comparison on Ecorr, computing the ~b as before,
and apply the same shift-and-MUX operations to both Ecorr and the ciphertext
containing the indexes. This ensures that when the MAX value arrives in slot 0
in Ecorr, the index of the corresponding column will arrive at slot 0 of the other
ciphertext.
Extracting the k most correlated columns. Now that we computed the indexes
of the k significant columns, we proceed to extract these columns from the raw-data
ciphertexts. Note that with the packing scheme as described above, each column j is
packed in all the coefficients of all the slots with hypercube indexes (j mod 6, j div 6, ?).
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We therefore implement a homomorphic operation, similar to the shift-and-MUX
from above, that given the bits of j, move each slot (j mod 6, j div 6, i) to position
(0, 0, i), then zero-out all other slots, thus extracting the raw data of column j. We
repeat this for column 0 (containing the yi’s) and columns i1, . . . , ik.
6.3.2.5 Computing the category counters
Now that we extracted the data corresponding to the relevant k + 1 columns, we need
to count for every value {0, 1}k+1, how many records (yi, ~x′i) we have with this value.
After the column extraction step above the bits of each column are packed in all the
coefficients of some of the slots (namely slots of index (0, 0, ?)) in several ciphertexts.
As a first step in computing the counters, we distribute the bits of each column j
among the slots of one ciphertext Cj , one bit per slot. This is doable since we have
1800 slots per ciphertext, and less than 1800 records in our dataset. (If we had more
records we could have used more ciphertexts to pack them, this would not have made
a big difference in running time.) Similar to other data movement procedures (e.g., the
replicate procedures from [44]), the bit distribution can be done using a shift-and-add
approach, and there are some time-vs.-noise trade-offs to be had. In our program we
somewhat optimized this step, but more optimizations are certainly possible.
After we have the bits from each column j in the slots of one ciphertext Cj , we proceed
to compute in a SIMD manner all the indicator bits χi,m, for i = 0, . . . , n and m ∈ [2k+1],
indicating whether the record ~x′i, yi belongs to category m. I.e., whether (yi|~x′i) = bin(m).
This is done simply by taking all the subset products of the k+1 ciphertexts Cj . Namely
we compute the product ciphertexts P0, P1, . . . , P2k+1−1 as follows:
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P0 := (1− C0) . . . (1− Ck−1)  (1− Ck)
P1 := (1− C0) . . . (1− Ck−1)  Ck
P2 := (1− C0) . . .  Ck−1  (1− Ck)
P3 := (1− C0) . . .  Ck−1  Ck
...
P2k+1−1 := C0  . . .  Ck−1  Ck
Computing all these 2k+1 products is done in depth dlog2(k + 1)e, and using not
much more than 2k+1 multiplications, as we describe in Section 6.4. (Specifically, for our
choice of k = 5 we use 96 multiplies.)
At this point, each slot i in the ciphertext Pm contains the indicator bit χi,m. All that
is left is to sum up all the slots in each ciphertext Pi (as integers in binary representation),
getting the bits of the corresponding counter. In our program we implemented a special-
purpose accumulation procedure for this purpose, described in Section 6.5 (but that
procedure is not very well optimized). The accumulation of the Pm’s for m = 0 . . . , 2
k−1
gives the counters Nm, and the accumulation of the Pm’s for m = 2
k, . . . , 2k+1 − 1 gives
the counters Ym−2k .
Our accumulation routine also includes a transpose-like operation: In the input we
have different categories (buckets) represented by different ciphertexts, with the different
rows across the slots. In the output we have the different categories across the slots
and different ciphertexts for different bit positions. (We expect seven-bit counters in the
output, so we have seven ciphertexts Q0, . . . , Q6 encrypting the bits of the counters. The
slots in
∑
2iQi give all the counter values, with the m’th counter in the m’th slot.) We
therefore need to “transpose” from categories across different ciphertexts to categories
across slots in the same ciphertext. This transpose-like operation is handled at the same
time as the accumulation: Beginning with all the slots in the input corresponding to
bits of the same counter, we gradually accumulate many bits in larger integers, thereby
clearing the slots of these bits so we can pack in these slots the integers for other counters,
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until we have the integers of all the counters packed across the slots of the result.
6.3.2.6 Computing the variance and log-ratio
Next we need to compute from Ym and Nm the values Vm =
YmNm
Ym+Nm
and Um = Vm ·
ln(Ym/Nm). Computing the variance and log-ratio is done using table lookups: As
described in Section 6.4, for some function f that we want to compute, we pre-compute
a table Tf such that T [x] = f(x) for all x. These tables are computed with some fixed
input and output precision, which means that the values there are only approximate.
(In our program we use 7 input bits and 7 output bits for most tables.)
We use tables for three functions in our program, specifically Tinv[x] ≈ 1/x, Tinv1[x] ≈
1/(x+ 1), and Tln[x] ≈ ln(x)/(x+ 1). Then given Ym and Nm we compute
rm := Ym · Tinv[Nm] ≈ Ym/Nm,
Vm := Ym · Tinv1[rm] ≈ Ym · 1Ym/Nm+1 = YmNm/(Ym +Nm)
Um := Ym · Tln[rm] ≈ ln(Ym/Nm) · YmNm/(Ym +Nm)
Since the counters are packed in the different slots of the ciphertexts Qi, then we only
need to perform these operations once to compute in SIMD all the Vm’s and Um’s.
6.3.2.7 Computing the matrix A and vector ~b
The next step is to compute A := Ck × diag(~V ) × CTk and ~b := Ck × ~U (over the
rationals), using the bit representation of the Vm’s and Um’s (which in our program
are represented by seven bits each). Given the structure of the 0-1 matrix Ck, in our
k = 5 implementation these computations require computing a relatively small number
of subset-sums of these numbers (in binary representation). In particular, for every two
bits position `1, `2 ∈ {0 . . . k − 1}, we need to sum up all the number Vm corresponding
to indexes m with bits `1, `2 set (i.e, m`1 = m`2 = 1), and we also need one more subset
sum of all the numbers Vm of even index (m0 = 0). Similar subset sums should be
computed of the numbers Um, and we pack the numbers Um, Vm in such a way that the
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sums for Um, Vm can be computed together.
Computing all the entries of A,~b for our case k = 5 takes only 16 subset sums. Note
that since the different numbers are packed in different slots, then adding two numbers
require that we rotate the ciphertext to align the slots of these numbers. Again we
carefully packed the numbers in the slots to reduce the number of rotations needed, and
this step in its entirety requires 50 different rotation amounts (each applied to all the
seven bits of the numbers, for a total of 350 rotation operations).
6.3.2.8 Solving A~w′ = ~b
The final operation that needs to be computed is solving the linear system A~w′ = ~b over
the rationals to find ~w′. Here, however, we have a problem: recall that the procedures
above only compute an approximation of A,~b (mostly due to our use of low precision
in the table-lookup-based implementation of inversion and logarithm). Hence we must
use a very numerically-stable method for solving this linear system in order to get a
meaningful result, and such methods are expensive.
One solution (which is what we implemented) is to simply send A,~b back to the client,
along with the indexes j1, . . . , jk of the significant columns. The client then decrypts and
solves in the clear to find ~w′ and therefore ~w. The drawback of this solution, of course, is
that it leaks to the client more information than just the solution vector ~w′. In Section 6.6
we describe a solution that prevents this extra leakage, leaking to the client only as much
information as contained in ~w′, without having to implement homomorphically expensive
linear-system solvers. However we did not get around to implementing this solution in
our program. (We remark that implementing it would not have added significantly to
the running time.)
6.3.2.9 Bootstrapping considerations
As it turns out, most of the runtime of our program is spent in the recryption operations,
between 66% and 75%. We must therefore be frugal with these operations. Some things
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that we did to save on them include:
• Fully packed recryption. HElib can bootstrap fully packed ciphertexts, i.e., ones
that encode φ(m) coefficients in one ciphertext. The ciphertexts that we manipu-
late in our procedure, however, are seldom fully packed. Hence, whenever we need
to perform recryption, we first pack as much data as we can in a single ciphertext,
then bootstrap that ciphertext, and unpack the data back to the ciphertexts where
it came from.
• Strategic recryption. Instead of performing recryption only at the last minute,
we check the level of our ciphertexts before every big step in our program. For
example, before we begin to add two numbers in binary representation, we check
all the bit encryptions to ensure that we could complete the operation without
needing to recrypt. If any of the input bits is at a low enough level, we pack all the
input bits as above and recrypt them all. Then we unpack and perform the entire
big step without any further recryption operations. This way we ensure that we
never need to recrypt temporary variables that are used in internal computations,
only the real data which is being manipulated.
6.4 Using Table Lookup to Compute Arbitrary Functions
Unfortunately, due to the work of this chapter being done in collaboration with IBM, the
source code of the general implementation described previously is not available due to
copyright. However, the low-level functions that were written, such as the table lookup
of this section and the binary operations in section 6.5 were directly contributed to the
open source library HElib [48]. Wherever possible we will provide a reference to the
implementation of each procedure, providing the name of both the source and header
files which can be found here [48].
As explained in section 6.3, we used a solution based on table lookup to implement
a low-precision approximation of arbitrary functions. Namely, for a function f that we
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need to compute, we pre-compute in the clear a table Tf such that Tf [x] = f(x) for every
x in some range. Then given the encryptions of the (bits of) x, we perform homomorphic
table lookup to get the (bits of) the value Tf [x].
Building the table. Importantly, implementing a function using table lookup relies
on fixed-point arithmetic. Namely the input and output must be encoded with a fixed
precision and fixed scaling. In our implementation, we have three fixed-point parame-
ters, precision p, scale s, and a Boolean flag ν that indicates if the numbers are to be
interpreted as unsigned (ν = false) or as signed in 2’s complement (ν = true). Given the
parameters (p, s, ν), a p-bit string (xp−1 . . . x1x0) is interpreted as the rational number





2ixi + (−1)ν · 2p−1xp−1
)
.
In our implementation we have two such sets of parameters, (p, s, ν) for the input (i.e.,
indexes into T ), and (p′, s′, ν ′) for the output (i.e., values in T ). With these parame-
ters, the table will have 2p entries, each big enough to hold a 2p
′
-bit number. In our
implementation we pack all the bits of the output in one plaintext slot, so we can only
accommodate tables with output precision up to the size of the slots.
Preparing the table Tf with parameters (p, s, ν, p
′, s′, ν ′) for a function f(·), each entry
in the table consists of a native plaintext element (i.e, an element in Z[X]/(Φm(X), pr),
in our case m = 215 − 1, pr = 211). For every index i ∈ [2pin ], we put in Tf [i], and








where dxcp′,s′ rounds the real value x to the nearest point in the set 2−s
′ · [2p′ ].
The implementation for building a lookup table was integrated into the HElib library
[48]. The Application Programming Interface (API) of the procedure buildLookupTable
can be found in tableLookup.h and the corresponding implementation is located in
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tableLookup.cpp.
Saturated arithmetic. When building the table, we need to handle cases where the
function value is not defined at some point, or is too large to encode in p′ bits. In
these cases, the number that we store in the table will be either the largest or smallest
number (as appropriate) that can be represented with the given parameters p′, s′, ν ′.
(For example, in the table for f(x) = 1/x, the entry T1/x[0] will have the MAXINT
value 2p
′ − 1 encoded in all the slots.)
Computing all subset-products. The main subroutine in homomorphic table lookup
is a procedure that computes all the subset products of a vector of bits. The input is an
array of p encrypted bits σp−1, . . . , σ1, σ0, and the output is a vector of 2
p bits ρm of all
the subset products of the σi’s the their negation, i.e.,
ρ0 := (1− σi)· . . . ·(1− σp−1) · (1− σp)
ρ1 := (1− σi)· . . . ·(1− σp−1) · σp
ρ2 := (1− σ0)· . . . · σp−1 · (1− σp)
ρ3 := (1− σ0)· . . . · σp−1 · σp
...
ρ2p−1 := σ0 · . . . · σp−1 · σp







To compute all these products ρm we use a “product tree” that on one hand ensure
that the multiplication depth remains as low as possible (namely dlog2 pe), and on the
other hand tries to use as few multiplication operations as possible. For p power of two,
this can be done recursively as follows:
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ComputeAllProducts(input: σp−1, . . . , σ0, output: ρ2p−1, . . . , ρ0)
1. if p = 1 return ρ0 := 1− σ0, ρ1 := σ0
2. else
2. ComputeAllProducts(in: σp/2−1, . . . , σ0, out: ρ
′
2p/2−1, . . . , ρ
′
0)
4. ComputeAllProducts(in: σp−1, . . . , σp/2, out: ρ
′′
2p/2−1, . . . , ρ
′′
0)
5. for i, j in 0, . . . , 2p/2, set ρ2p/2j+i := ρ
′′
j · ρ′i.
Essentially the same procedure applies when p is not a power of two, except that it
is better to split the array so that the first part is of size power of two (i.e., size 2` for
` = dlog2 pe − 1) and the second part is whatever is left.
The implementation of computeAllProducts was integrated into the HElib library
[48]. The API and corresponding implementation can be found in tableLookup.h and
tableLookup.cpp respectively.
We comment that this procedure is not quite optimal in terms of the number of
multiplications that it uses, but it is not too bad. Specifically the number of multi-
plications that it uses to compute the 2p products is only N(p) = 2p + 2N(p/2) =
2p+2p/2+1 +2p/4+2 + · · · . One optimization that we have in our program is that we stop
the recursion at p = 2 rather than p = 1, and compute the four output bits using just
a single multiplication (rather than four). Namely we set ρ3 = σ1σ0, ρ2 = σ1 − σ1σ0,
ρ1 = σ0 − σ1σ0, and ρ0 = 1 + σ1σ0 − σ1 − σ0.
This optimization can in principle be extended to higher values of p, but it gets more




σj . The τm’s can be computed using a recursive formula similar
to the one above, except that in the last line if i = 0 or j = 0 we do not need to multiply.
(For i = 0 we set τ2p/2j := τ
′′
j and for j = 0 we set τi := τ
′
i .) Hence the number of
products is reduced to N ′(p) = (2p/2 − 1)2 + 2N ′(p/2) = 2p − p− 1. The problem with
this procedure is that recovering the ρm’s from the τm’s seems complicated (and the
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savings are not that large), so we did not attempt to implement it.
Homomorphic table lookup. Once we have a table T [0, . . . , 2p−1] and an implemen-
tation of the subset-product procedure above, implementing homomorphic lookups into
the table with encrypted p-bit indexes requires just a simple MUX. Namely, we are given
p ciphertexts, encrypting the bits σi of an index into T . We apply the subset-product
procedure above to get all the products ρm, then return
∑
m T [m]   ρm.
Note that the input ciphertext could be packed, with a different bit σi,j in each slot j
of ciphertext i. In this case our lookup procedure would return a SIMD table lookup: the




We also remark that it is possible to implement different tables in different slots, so
the j’th output slot will contain Tj [xj ] instead of all using the same table T . This will
require only a minor change to our procedure for building the table (and no change to
the homomorphic lookup procedure), but we have not yet implemented this variant.
An implementation of the table lookup procedure, tableLookup, can be found in the
HElib library [48]. The API and corresponding implementation of this procedure can be
found in tableLookup.h and tableLookup.cpp respectively.
6.5 Binary Arithmetic and Comparisons
Much of our logistic-regression procedure manipulates the various variables in their
binary representation. To implement these manipulations, we rely on procedures that
implement various common low-level operations, such as arithmetic and comparisons in
binary representation. In this section we describe our implementation of these low-level
operations, which has been integrated into the HElib library [48].
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6.5.1 Adding Two Integers
One basic operation that we need is adding two integers in binary representation. The
input consists of two sequences of ciphertexts, (at−1, . . . , a1, a0) and (bt−1, . . . , b1, b0),
encrypting the bits of two integers a, b, respectively (using padding, we can assume
w.l.o.g. that the two integers have the same bit size).4 The output is the sequence of
ciphertexts (st+1, . . . , s1, s0), encrypting the bits of the sum s = a + b. Of course the
hard part is to compute the carry bits in the addition, which we do as follows:
• For i = 0, ..., t− 1 we compute “generate carry” and “propagate carry” bits, gi :=
aibi and pi := ai + bi. (Note that at most one of pi, gi can be 1.)
• We extend the generate and propagate bits to intervals, where for any i ≤ j we
have p[i,j] =
∏j
k=i pk and g[i,j] = gi ·
∏j
k=i+1 pk.
• The carry bit out of position j is cj :=
∑j
i=0 g[i,j], and the result bits are si :=
ai + bi + ci−1 for i = 0, . . . , t.
To get all the carry bits ci, we therefore need to compute all the interval products g[i,j]
for all [i, j] ⊆ [0, t − 1], which we do using a dynamic-programming approach. Namely
we compute for all the intervals of size two, then all intervals of size up to four, etc.
To achieve this we use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) which is a finite, directed
graph made of finite vertices and directed edges. Additionally if one starts at any vertex
v and follows a sequence of edges which are consistently directed then it is not possible
to return to vertex v. In more detail, given the inputs ai, bi we build an addition DAG
(Directed Acyclic Graph) that encodes our plan for what ciphertexts to multiply in what
order. This is done to ensure that we consume the smallest number of levels, and use
as few multiplications as we can. Note that the input ciphertexts need not be all at the
same level, and the plan may vary depending on the input levels.
4We can have different bits in different plaintext slots of these ciphertexts, so each slot could represent
a different integer and the addition will be applied to all of them.
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The DAG has two nodes for every interval [j, i] ⊆ [0, t − 1], representing p[i,j] and
g[i,j], and each node has two parents which are the nodes that should be multiplied to
form the variable of this node. We initialize the nodes in the DAG in the following order:
• First we initialize all the singleton nodes p[i,i], the parents are set to ai, bi and the
level is set to min(lvl(ai), lvl(bi)).
• Next we initialize all the other nodes p[i,j] in order of increasing interval size. To
initialize p[i,j+1], we compute







(breaking ties as described later in this section). The parents of p[i,j+1] are set to





• Next we initialize all the singleton nodes g[i,i], the parents are set to ai, bi and the
level is set to min(lvl(ai), lvl(bi))− 1.
• Finally we initialize all the other nodes g[i,j] in order of increasing interval size. To
initialize p[i,j+1], we compute







(breaking ties as described later in this section). The parents of p[i,j+1] are set to





This procedure ensures that each node ends up at the highest possible level (i.e. the
lowest possible multiplication depth), for the given levels of the inputs ai, bi. When all
the input bits ai, bi are at the same level, then the depth is dlog2(t+2)e, since the largest
term that we need to compute is the (t+ 1)-product g[0,t−1] = a0b0 ·
∏t−1
i=1(ai + bi + 1).
We note, however, that not all the nodes in the DAG must be computed: Only the
nodes g[i,j] are used in the carry calculation, and not every p[i,j] is necessarily an ancestor
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of some g[i′,j′]. We can hope that by breaking ties in a clever way when computing argmax
above, we can minimize the number of nodes p[i,j] that need to be computed, hence
reducing the number of multiplications that must be performed. In our implementation,
we break ties heuristically by choosing among the highest-level k’s the nodes that already
have the largest number of children.
The homomorphic addition procedure. Given the input ciphertexts ai and bi, we
build a DAG as above, and check that the lowest-level node in this DAG is still at a level
above zero. If not, then we attempt to recrypt all the input ciphertexts, then re-build
the DAG with the new input levels. Once we have a valid DAG, we compute all the
g[i,j] nodes and from then add them as needed to compute all the carry bits, and then
compute the result bits.
While computing the g[i,j]’s, we try to compute the nodes in the DAG lazily, com-
puting each node only when it is needed (either directly for one of the carry bits or
indirectly for one of its children), and keeping the intermediate node ciphertexts around
only as long as they are still needed. (I.e., as long as they still have some descendants
that were not yet computed.) We also use parallelism when we can, computing different
nodes using different threads (if we have them).
The implementation of this procedure, called addTwoNumbers, has been integrated
into HElib [48]. The Application Programming Interface (API) of the procedure can be
found in binaryArith.h along with the implementation in binaryArith.cpp.
6.5.2 Adding Many Integers
When we need to add many integers (all in binary representation), we use the three-for-
two method (cf. [53]) to reduce their number: until we only have two integers left, then
use the routine from above to add the remaining two numbers.
The three-for-two procedure. Given three integers in binary representation, (ut−1,
. . . , u0), (vt−1 . . . v0), (wt−1 . . . w0), we can add the three bits in each position ui+vi+wi
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(over the integers), yielding a number between zero and three that can be represented
in two bits. Namely ui + vi + wi = xi + 2yi, where xi = ui + vi + wi (mod 2) and
yi = uivi + uiwi + viwi (mod 2). Adding every triple of bits ui, vi, wi in this manner, we
get the two integers x = (xt−1 . . . x0), and y = (yt . . . y00), such that x+ y = u+ v + w
over the integers.
Computing the bits of x involves only additions, and each yi can be computed using
two multiplications and two additions, namely yi := uivi + (ui + vi)wi. Hence x is at the
same level as the input numbers u, v, w, and y is one level lower. (Note also that all the
xi’s and yi’s can be computed in parallel.)
The add-many-numbers procedure. Given many integers in binary, we apply the
three-for-two procedure to them in a tree manner, namely we partition them into groups
of three, apply the three-for-two to each group separately, then collect all the resulting
pairs (plus whatever leftover numbers were not part of any group) into one list, and
repeat the process until only two integers are left. This yields multiplication depth
d ≈ log3/2(n) to reduce n numbers into two, while adding at most d to the bitsize of the
input integers. Once we have only two integers left, we apply the addition routine from
above.
This procedure was implemented and added to the HElib library [48]. The API is
located in binaryArith.h under addManyNumbers and the corresponding implementa-
tion can be found in binaryArith.cpp.
6.5.3 Integer Multiplication
Given two integers in binary to multiply a = (at−1 . . . a0) and b = (bt′−1 . . . b0), we first
compute all the pairwise products biaj , and then use the add-many-numbers procedure
from above to add the t′ integers 2ibi · a. For example when multiplying a 3-bit b by a
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4-bit a, we add the numbers
b0 · a = b0a3 b0a2 b0a1 b0a0
2b1 · a = b1a3 b1a2 b1a1 b1a0 0
4b2 · a = b2a3 b2a2 b2a1 b2a0 0 0
When both numbers are unsigned, we always choose t′ ≤ t, namely we let the longer
integer be a and the shorter one be b.
Dealing with negative numbers. In our implementation we also implemented a
multiplication of a 2s-complement number a by an unsigned number b. In that case
we always use the 2s-complement number as a and the unsigned number as b, and
we modify the procedure above by computing the sign extension of all the numbers
bi · a, namely replicating the top bit in each number all the way to the largest bit
position. For example, if we have a 2-bit 2s-complement number (a1 a0) and a three-bit
unsigned number (b2 b1 b0), then we compute and add the three integers (considered as
2s-complement numbers):
b0 · a = b0a1 b0a1 b0a1 b0a0
2b1 · a = b1a1 b1a1 b1a0 0
4b2 · a = b2a1 b2a0 0 0 .
An implementation of this procedure was integrated into the HElib library [48] under the
name multTwoNumbers. The implementation and API can be found in binaryArith.cpp
and binaryArith.h respectively. It is noted that we did not implement a 2s-complement
by 2s-complement multiplication, since we did not need it for the current project.
6.5.4 Comparing Two Integers
The procedure for integer comparison is somewhat similar to integer addition. We have
two integers in binary, a = (at−1, . . . , a1, a0) and b = (bt−1, . . . , b1, b0), and we want to
compute the two integers x = max(a, b) = (xt−1 . . . x0) and y = min(a, b) = (yt−1 . . . y0),
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as well as the two indicator bits µ = (a > b) and ν = (b > a) (note that when a = b,
both µ, ν are zero).
We begin by computing for every i < t the bits ei := ai+ bi+1 (which is 1 iff ai = bi)













1 (one iff at−1...i > bt−1...i). Computing the products
e∗i , g
∗
i is done using a recursive procedure somewhat similar to ComputeAllProducts from
Section 6.4. Finally we compute the results by setting µ := g̃0, ν := 1 + g̃0 + e
∗
0, and for
i = 0, . . . , t− 1 we set xi := (ai + bi)g̃i + bi and yi := xi + ai + bi.
Note that we use all the g∗i ’s but only e
∗
0 for computing the output results, hence
we somewhat optimized our procedure for computing these products by skipping the
computation of e∗i ’s that are never used.
We remark that the last product (ai + bi)g̃i means that our procedure may use depth
one more than the minimum possible. Using the absolutely smallest possible depth is
challenging, straightforward solutions would take O(t2) multiplications (vs. O(t) multi-
plications in the procedure above). While getting minimal depth with O(t) multiplica-
tions is possible in theory, the procedure for doing this is overly complex (and extremely
hard to parallelize), so we opted for a simpler procedure with slightly non-optimal depth.
(Also, as opposed to the addition procedure from above, the simple procedure that we
implemented here does not vary depending on the level of the input ciphertexts for ai, bi.)
The implementation of this procedure, compareTwoNumbers, was integrated into the
HElib library [48]. The API and corresponding implementation of this procedure can be
found in binaryCompare.h and binaryCompare.cpp respectively.
6.5.5 Accumulating the bits in a ciphertext
As described in Section 6.3.2, when computing the category counters we at some point
have 64 ciphertexts, with ciphertext Cm encrypting in each slot i the indicator bits
χi,m, and we want to sum-up these indicator bits (over the integers) and compute the
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64 counters Pm
∑
i χi,m. While this is theoretically just an instance of adding many
numbers (these numbers being the bits χi,m), there are two properties of this instance
that require special optimization:
• The input bits to be added are not aligned in the same slots of different ciphertexts,
but rather spread across the different slots of the same ciphertext.
• We need to perform this add-many-numbers procedure on 64 different lists in par-
allel, so we have an opportunity to use SIMD operations.
We therefore implemented a special-purpose shift-and-add procedure to do the accu-
mulation, combining the addition operations that we need to make with the “matrix
transpose” that transforms the input counter-per-ciphertext with different bits across
the slots into a ciphertext-per-bit-position in the output with the different counters
across the slots.
At every step in this procedure we keep a current list of (encrypted) arrays of integers
in binary representation. Each array in the list is represented by a vector of ciphertexts
(c0, c1, . . .), one per bit position, and the integers in the array are the different slots of∑
i 2
i · ci. Initially the list consists of 64 arrays, each array corresponding to the different
slots of one of the input ciphertexts, and the integers all bits (so each array is represented
by length-1 vector). As the computation progresses, the integers represent partial sums
(so their bitsize is getting larger), correspondingly the arrays have fewer integers in them
(since the number of partial sums is getting smaller), and also the number of arrays get
smaller (as we pack more counters across the slots).
In each step we perform partial addition, adding each group of r partial sums into a
single larger sum. We first apply r rotations to all the ciphertexts representing all the
arrays, so as to align the numbers that we need to add. These rotations mean that we
are using fewer slots to hold these partial sums (since we only use one of each r slots as
the “pivot” where addition is to take place). So we can pack some number p ≤ r of these
sums and apply the add-many-numbers procedure to all of them in a SIMD manner.
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This cuts the number of arrays by a p factor, and change the size of arrays by a p/r
factor. (Each array is cut by a factor of r because we add r partial sums into one, but
increased by a factor of p as we pack multiple arrays into one.)
The procedure that we actually implemented is slightly different, in that in the first
few steps we consider the different bit positions as different arrays (so we always work
with bits rather than larger integers) and just remember for each array the power of
two that it should be multiplied by. Only after we complete the “transpose” part of
this transformation and have just one slot per counter, we add together all the relevant
integers (shifted as needed to account for the powers of two). Specifically, we begin with
64 arrays, each containing 1800 single-bit integers. Then we perform these steps: of four
steps:
1. In the first step we group r1 = 15 bits together for addition (yielding 4-bit num-
bers), and pack p1 = 14 arrays together. This yields 4 · d64/14e = 20 new arrays
(of bits), and the data for each category counter is spread across 1800/15 = 120
slots.
2. In the second step we group r2 = 12 bits together for addition (again melding 4-bit
numbers), and pack p2 = 5 them together. This yields 4 · d20/5e = 16 arrays of
bits, and the data for each category counter is spread across only 120/12 = 10
slots.
3. In the this step we group r2 = 10 bits together for addition (again yielding 4-bit
numbers), and no further packing is needed. This yields again 4 · 16 = 64 arrays
of bits, but now the data for each category counter is all in just one slot position.
4. We note that our current 64 ciphertexts encrypt shifted bits, i.e., bits that should
be multiplied by some powers of two. No shift amount corresponds to more than
twelve ciphertexts, so we can re-arrange these 64 bits in just 12 integers. Then we
call our add-many-numbers procedure to add these 12 integers thereby completing
the accumulation of the category counters.
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The specific choices of r1 = 15, p1 = 14 and r2 = 12, p1 = 5 were made so that the shift
operations involved in aligning numbers before addition could be implemented with 1D
rotation operations. These operations map directly to automorphisms in the underlying
cryptosystem, rather than the more expensive general-purpose shifts.
6.6 Solving a Linear System
The last thing that our solution needs to do, after setting the linear system A~w′ = ~b, is to
solve it and output the solution vector ~w′. But solving a linear system homomorphically
is complex, even if it is only a 6-by-6 system as in our application. Moreover, the linear
system that we computed was just an approximation (due mostly to the low-precision
inherent in our table-based approach to computing inversion and logarithms). Hence we
must ensure that our homomorphic solver is numerically stable, making it harder still.
Instead, in our program we opted for simply sending A and ~b to the client, having
the client decrypt and solve in the clear. This “solution”, however, leaks information
about the input data beyond what is implied by the vector ~w′. This extra leakage is
perhaps acceptable in the context of our application to logistic regression on medical
data, but surely there are applications where such a solution will not be acceptable. So
we would like to find a feasible solution that will eliminate the extra leakage, simpler
than implementing a homomorphic stable linear solver.
6.6.1 Randomized Encoding with Rational Reconstruction
An appealing approach for addressing this issue is to use randomized encoding (cf. [3]).
Namely, consider the function that we want to compute, f(A,~b) = A−1~b, as a function
over the rational numbers with bounded integer inputs. We would like to apply a ran-
domized transformation to the input u := enc(A,~b;R), such that (i) it is possible to
“decode” A−1~b from u; (ii) u does not yield any more information5 on A,~b than what is
5This property is formulated by requiring a simulator that can only see ~w′ and can output the same
distribution as enc(A,~b;R)
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implied by ~w′ = A−1~b; and (iii) computing enc(·) is substantially easier than computing
f(·) itself.
If we had such randomized encoding, we could choose the randomness R and eval-
uate homomorphically enc(A,~b;R), send the encrypted u back to the client, who could
decrypt u and decode ~w′ from it. We note that the linear-system-solver function f(·) is in
NC1, so theoretically we could apply generic randomized encoding solutions here. This
solution yields a very low-depth encoding, but the size of the encoding is exponential in
the depth of the circuit for f , so we do not expect them to be practical.
Below we describe a randomized encoding for the linear-system-solver function f ,
that uses only integer addition and multiplication. This encoding can therefore be imple-
mented using the binary arithmetic routines that we described in Section 6.5. However
we did not implement that idea in our solution, we expect it to be doable but it will add
a significant overhead (see below).
Our first observation is that if we wanted to compute the linear-system-solver function
modulo some prime q then it would be easy to randomize (when A is invertible): All
we need is to choose a random invertible R ∈ Zn×nq and set A∗ := RA mod q and
~b∗ := R~b mod q. On one hand A∗ is just a random invertible function modulo q, and on
the other hand (A∗)−1 ~b∗ = A−1~b (mod q).
However, in our case we want to find the solution over the rational numbers, not
modulo some q. Our second observation is that we can apply here the tool of rational
reconstruction (cf. [73, Ch 4.6]). Recall that rational reconstruction is an efficient
procedure (denoted below by RationalRec(·)), such that
∀a, b, q ∈ Z s.t. |a| · |b| < q/2, RationalRec(q, ab−1 mod q) = (a, b),
provided that ab−1 is defined modulo q. In other words, the procedure gets as input a
modulus q and an element z ∈ Zq, and it is guaranteed to output the unique solution
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(a, b) to az = b (mod q) satisfying |a| · |b| < q/2, if such a solution exists.
In our application we are given A,~b with some precision p, and the rational solution
that we seek is
~w′ = A−1~b = adj(A)~b/det(A).
Every entry of ~w′ is of the form x/d, where d = det(A) and x is one entry in adj(A)~b.
Since all the entries in A, ~B are smaller than 2p, then d and all the entries of adj(A)~b
are smaller in magnitude than (
√
n2p)n. If we choose q > 2(
√
n2p)2n = 22np+1nn, then
given the solution A−1~b mod q with entries of the form xd−1 ∈ Zq, we could use rational
reconstruction to get the rational numbers x/d. We could therefore get our randomized
encoding by randomizing A,~b modulo this large q.
But this solution is still not good enough, randomizing mod q implies in particular
that we need to implement a homomorphic mod-q operation, which is expensive (even
when q is in the clear). Our next observation is that we can replace the reduction mod-q
by adding a large enough multiple of q. Recall that for any fixed integer x, if we choose
a random s from a large enough domain (relative to |x|/q) then the random variable
x + qs depends only on the value of x mod q, and is essentially independent of x div q.
Specifically, if we have a bound |x|/q < B and we choose s at random from [B · 2k], then
the result is almost independent of x÷ q, up to statistical distance of at most 2k.
Hence instead of computing homomorphically the reduced matrix RA mod q, we note
that each entry in RA is smaller than n2pq in absolute value. We can therefore choose a
random integer matrix S ∈ [n2p+k] and compute RA+qS over the integers (and similarly
for ~b).
This solution is almost plausible, but it requires integer arithmetic with very large
numbers, even if n and p are small. In our application we have n = 6 and p = 7, so
q = 66 · 22·6·7+1 ≈ 2100. And even choosing a measly statistical parameter k = 10, the
entries of RA+ qS would be integers with about 120 bits.
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Parameters: dimension n, precision p, security parameter k.
Let m := max(n, d2np+1k e)
REncSolver (input: Invertible matrix A ∈ Zn×n2p , vector ~b ∈ Zn2p):
1. Choose m random primes q1, . . . , qm of bitsize n2
k.
2. For each qi do
3. Choose a random invertible matrix R ∈ Zn×nq1
4. Choose at random a matrix Si ∈ Zn×nn2p+k and a vector ~ti ∈ Z
n
n2p+k
5. Compute A∗i := Ri ×A′ + qSi and ~bi
∗
:= Ri × ~b′ + q~ti.
6. Output {(qi, A∗i , ~b∗i)}mi=1
DecSolver(input: {(qi, A∗i , ~b∗i)}mi=1):
7. Solve ~w∗i = (A
∗
i )
−1 ~b∗i (mod q)i for all i
8. Use Chinese remaindering to recover ~w∗ modulo q =
∏
i qi
9. Apply rational reconstruction and output ~w := RationalRec(q, ~w∗).
Figure 6.1: Randomized encoding for the rational linear-system solver, f(A,~b) = A−1~b.
Our final observation, therefore, is that we could express R and S relative to an appro-
priate CRT basis, thereby replacing each big-integer operation by a moderate number of
operations on much smaller integers. Specifically, we choose many “smallish” primes qi,
for each one choose a random Ri ∈ Zn×nqi and Si ∈ [n2
p+k]n×n and compute homomorphi-
cally A∗i = RiA+ qiSi (and similarly for
~b). As above, the client who decrypts the A∗i ’s
only get RiA mod qi, then compute RA mod q (where q =
∏
qi
and R ≡ Rq (mod qi))
and proceed as before.
One drawback with this approach is that we may end up choosing a modulus qi that
divides det(A), in which case RiA mod qi will reveal mod-qi linear correlations between
the columns of A. We therefore must choose the qi’s of size slightly larger than 2
k, to
ensure the same level of protection against this threat as we get against leakage from the
A∗i ’s. Setting qi ≈ n2k would mean that we only need to work with integers of total size
about n22p+2k. In our setting with n = 6, p = 7 we can choose the (admittedly weak)
k = 15 and work with 42-bit numbers, which is expensive but doable. (With 18-bit qi’s,
we would need six of them to reach the size of q that we need.) Our randomized encoding
procedure is described in Figure 6.1. From the discussion above we have:
Claim 1. The function REncSolver from Figure 6.1 is a randomized encoding for the
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function f(A,~b) = A−1~b over the rational numbers, where A is invertible and A,~b are
bounded. 
6.6.2 Are We Still Leaking Too Much?
We end this section by pointing out that the above solution is a randomized encoding for
the exact solution function vector A−1~b, which by itself may already leak information. In
particular it usually reveals the determinant det(A) (or a factor of it), just by taking the
common denominator of all the entries in the solution vector. In the current application,
what we really want to compute is the limited precision solution function, that rounds
the exact solution to some given precision. (We can even tolerate small error in the
solution.) We do not know of any feasible randomized encoding for this limited precision
function.
6.7 Implementation and Performance
All of our testing was done on an Intel Xeon E5-2698 v3 (which is a Haswell processor),
with two sockets and sixteen cores per socket, running at 2.30GHz. The machine has
250GB of main memory, the compiler was GCC version 4.8.5, and we used NTL version
10.5.0 and GnuMP version 6.0.
Parameters. We worked with the cyclotomic ring Z[X]/Φm(X) with m = 215 − 1 =
32767 (so φ(m) = 27000) The largest modulus q in the moduli-chain was about 1030-
bit long, corresponding to about 80 bits of security. The plaintext space was set to
211 = 2048 (but as we explained in Section 6.3, most of the computation was done with
plaintext space modulo 2). This gave as a total of 1800 plaintext slots, arranged in a
30 × 6 × 10 hypercube with the first two 30 × 6 being “good dimensions” and the last
being a “bad dimension”.6 Each plaintext slot held a degree-15 extension of the ring Z211
(or an element of GF (215) when we used it for mod-2 computation).
6The distinction between “good” and “bad” dimensions in HElib is that 1D-rotations along a good
dimension take a single automorphism, while along a bad dimension it takes two automorphisms and
some constant multiplies to zero out some data.
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This means that we could pack as many as 15 · 1800 = 27000 integers in a single
ciphertext each up to 11-bit long. But in our application we only packed in each of our
ciphertext either up to 27000 bits, or up to 180 11-bit integers, depending on the phase
of the computation.
Unfortunately, due to copyright reasons, access to the original code is restricted.
However, the core utility procedures were integrated into the open-source library HElib
[48], which have been indicated where necessary in the previous sections.
6.7.1 Timing Results
Single-threaded timing. A single-thread execution of the program took just under
five hours, from key-generation and encryption of the data up to and including the
computation of the matrix A and vector ~v. Homomorphic processing took just under
280 minutes of this time, and fifteen minutes were spent packing and encrypting the
raw data. The program used only about 4.5GB of RAM. Only 25% of the processing
time was spent on the application logic, and about 75% (210 minutes) was spent in 65
bootstrapping operations (so under 3 minutes per operation). The timing results for the
different phases of the computation are described in table 6-A:
• Computing the correlations and extracting its binary representation (corrBinary)
took almost no time, only 16 seconds;
• About 125 minutes (45% of the processing time) was spent comparing the corre-
lation numbers and computing the indexes of the five fields most correlated to the
disease (topIndexes);
• Once we found the indexes, it took 33 minutes (12%) to extract the actual data
corresponding to these fields (extractCols);
• Then it took 47 minutes (17%) to compute the 64 bucket counters and their binary
expansion (bucketCounters);
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# threads: 1 2 4 8 16 30
corrBinary .25 .18 .13 .13 .1 .1
topIndexes 125 72 42 35 24 24
extractCols 33 20 13 11 8.5 8.7
bucketCounters 47 28 18 16 12 12
compV&Y 60 35 20 16 10 10
compA&b 12 7.7 5.3 5 3.8 3.8
total 278 163 99 83 59 59
recrypt 210 119 70 56 38 38
Table 6-A: Timing results (minutes) of different phases of the logistic-regression program
• Computing the vectors ~v and ~y using table lookup operations (compV&Y) took
another hour (22%);
• Finally, computing the matrix A and vector ~b from the vectors ~v, ~y (compA&b )
took only 12 minutes (4%).
Multi-threaded timing. Multi-threading was very effective in reducing the compu-
tation time up to eight threads, but using more threads did not help very much (and
above sixteen threads the runtime leveled off completely). The processing time dropped
to 83 minutes with eight threads and just under one hour with sixteen threads. The
RAM consumption increased somewhat, from 4.5GB with one thread to 5.5GB with six-
teen. The fraction of time spend on bootstrapping dropped slightly, from 75% with one
thread to 64% with sixteen, indicating that multi-threading during bootstrapping was
somewhat more effective than in other parts of the computation. The ratio between dif-
ferent phases of the computation did not change much when switching to multi-threaded
implementation. See more details in table 6-A.
6.7.2 Is this Procedure Accurate Enough?
How good is the solution that we obtained from this procedure? As was done in the
iDASH competition itself, we measured our solution using the metric of “area under
curve” (AUC). The given data consisted of genomic data variables, and a target attribute
representing cancer. A random model is expected to give AUC result of 0.5. One of the
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attributes in this data was the BRCA gene, and taking only that attribute already
gives AUC result close to 0.6. On the other hand even the best plaintext-based logistic-
regression model only yields AUC of about 0.7 on that dataset. Hence the game for
this dataset was to get as far above 0.6 as possible.7 We tested our solution by running
it on sub-sampled data from the training dataset, and the AUC results were usually
close to 0.65. This appears similar to other solutions that were submitted to the iDASH
competition.
6.7.3 Timing results for the Various Components
Since our application used a large setting of parameters (m = 215−1) and spent most
of its time bootstrapping, the performance results above do not tell the story of how
the different components perform for smaller parameters or when bootstrapping is not
needed. These numbers are reported in Table 6-B, with (a) reporting the number of
native multiplications and circuit depth for the different operations, while in (b)-(d) we
report some performance numbers in various settings.
The addition operations we tested added two n-bit numbers to get their n+1-bit sum,
while the multiplication operations multiplied two n-bit numbers but only computed the
lower n bits of the result. In the tests below we varied the security level (when processing
8-bit numbers), the number of input bits (at security level 125), and also tested the effect
of multi-threading
The runtime of the operations range from a few seconds for addition and comparison
in the smaller settings to about one minute for multiplication and table lookup in the
larger setting. Some trends that can be seen in these numbers include the following:
• As expected, the running times of the various operations grow quasi-linearly with
the cyclotomic index m (which is more or less proportional to the security level).
7These numbers are said to be typical for genomic data, but it probably means that this is not a good
dataset on which to develop an approximation procedure. Still this is what we had, so this is what we
used.
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• As the input bitsize grows, the number of native multiplications (and hence the
running time) is roughly quadratic for addition, linear for comparison, and roughly
n2.3 for multiplication. (For table lookup, of course the number of products grows
exponentially with the bitsize, since the table itself grows exponentially with the
number of bits in the index.)
• Our table lookup implementation is embarrassingly parallel, and indeed we get
nearly linear speedup in the number of threads. For the other operations the
speedup is less pronounced. From one to eight threads we only get more or less
3X speedup, and above eight threads there are almost no additional gains.
6.8 Conclusions and Discussion
In this work we investigated the question of whether full blown FHE can be used for a
realistic use case. We devised a procedure to compute an approximate logistic regression
model on encrypted data, and demonstrated that this can be achieved in a matter of a
few hours (or even just one hour if we use multi-threading).
In the course of this work we developed many new tools for homomorphic computa-
tions. Many of these tools are general-purpose (such as binary arithmetic, table lookup,
etc.), but some are specific to the current setting (e.g., specific data packing and move-
ment schemes). Our experience in this work leads us to believe that the answer to our
motivating question is “Yes, but just barely.”
We stress that the main roadblock is not performance: devising a logistic regression
model in a matter of hours may be perfectly acceptable in many settings. (And clusters
or hardware acceleration can sometimes be brought to bear as well.) The main problem
was the lack of good development and support tools, developing an FHE application feels
a lot like programming using only assembly language. (Indeed the reason we did not
submit our work to the iDASH competition last year was because it was not debugged
in time.)
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(a) Number of native multiplications and circuit depth vs. bit sizes
addition comparison table lookup multiplication
bitsize # mults depth # mults depth # mults depth # mults depth
4 12 3 17 3 18 2 14 3
8 45 4 37 4 292 3 79 6
12 96 4 58 4 205 8
16 166 5 81 5 411 10
(b) Performance (seconds) for single-threaded 8-bit operations
security cyclotomic addition comparison table lookup multiplication
param m (φ(m)) time RAM time RAM time RAM time RAM
70 8191 (8190) 1.8 153 1.4 142 12.8 342 2.9 180
85 11441 (10752) 3.7 277 2.9 262 28.5 568 6.2 318
210 15709 (15004) 3.8 295 3.0 275 28.5 639 6.3 343
440 32767 (27000) 9.2 610 7.2 576 68.2 1232 15.0 697
(c) Multithreaded performance for 8-bit operations m = 15709 (security=210)
addition comparison table lookup multiplication
# threads time RAM time RAM time RAM time RAM
1 3.8 295 3.0 275 28.5 639 6.3 343
2 3.7 306 1.8 282 14.9 646 5.0 350
4 2.7 315 1.2 300 8.1 658 3.3 369
8 1.8 347 1.0 341 4.6 691 2.0 400
16 1.1 350 1.0 339 2.8 741 1.9 470
32 1.1 353 1.0 334 1.9 867 1.9 607
(d) Single-threaded performance for different input sizes
(encrypted at level 13, m = 15709, security parameter 125).
addition comparison table lookup multiplication
bitsize time RAM time RAM time RAM time RAM
4 1.3 359 2.0 355 2.5 375 1.4 368
8 5.5 415 4.4 387 43.1 937 9.1 486
12 12.0 482 6.8 419 23.7 636
16 21.3 564 9.4 451 47.4 880
Table 6-B: Complexity measures and performance results. Time in seconds, RAM in
MB.
Using FHE in real-world settings will require much more library and development
support, and many more FHE toolboxes beyond the few that we implemented in this
work. We believe that this is an important project, and expect to continue working along
these directions.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
7.1 Summary
This thesis has explored the practicality and usability of FHE schemes within a real-
world environment through the study of three varying applications. A key attribute of
FHE schemes is the ability to provide total security by limiting the leakage of information
to either the client or the server as information can be kept encrypted throughout the
process of the algorithm. The only information that is known by both parties is the
algorithm that is performed, otherwise the client can be assured the server never learns
any information about their data.
Firstly it was seen that FHE can be applied to an anonymous routing environment. A
key component of this application is the added security gained against a global adversary
that can observe the entire network. However this introduces numerous inefficiencies and
reduces the practicality of the scheme
Secondly, another aspect of the practicality of FHE was explored, namely the ability
to represent more than one type of number in an FHE environment. As FHE schemes
are built on modulo rings it is clear to see that integer arithmetic can be performed on
data in the encrypted domain. However, it is common to have data that requires a higher
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level of accuracy, thus a method of representing rational numbers was shown as well as
the application of this FHE scheme to evaluate linear regression homomorphically.
Lastly, a notable use case for FHE schemes is performing work on confidential infor-
mation such as medical data. Medical datasets can be very large and the algorithms
performed on them complex. True FHE schemes are known to be inefficient which leads
to most practical applications being a SWHE variant. Section 6 explored the feasibility
of “deep FHE” that performed logistic regression on a set of 1600 genomic data records.
7.2 Conclusion
The key contributions of this research are exploration of three aspects of the practicality
of FHE in real-world environment. One of these is a novel way of representing rational
numbers within FHE which opens the scheme to be applied to numerous additional
settings that require higher levels of precision without the need to increase the size of
the parameters. The other major contribution was showing the practicality of performing
complex functions homomorphically on real datasets.
Through these experiments it has been shown that FHE is still inefficient and may
be deemed impractical in settings that require algorithms that produce results in a short
time frame. However as the state-of-the-art continues to improve in addition to hardware
improvements, FHE schemes will eventually become prevalent in the near future. As for
the current practicality of the FHE schemes, in a setting where data security is more
important than the time it takes to homomorphically compute an algorithm, then FHE
can be the solution to performing such algorithms as has been shown in this thesis.
7.3 Future work
As was discussed in Section 6.8 a large problem of applying FHE to a realistic use case
is the fact that FHE libraries, especially from my experience using HElib, are still in
the process of maturing. A large portion of the work towards practicality is not simply
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building schemes from libraries but extending the capabilities of the current libraries
and developing support tools for FHE first. There is a lot of scope for work in this area
and as libraries continue to mature, FHE can become prevalent in the cryptographic
community in the foreseeable future.
Bibliography
[1] Carlos Aguilar-Melchor et al. “XPIR: Private information retrieval for everyone”.
In: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2016.2 (2016), pp. 155–174.
[2] Yoshinori AONO et al. “Privacy-Preserving Logistic Regression with Distributed
Data Sources via Homomorphic Encryption”. In: IEICE Transactions on Infor-
mation and Systems E99.D.8 (2016), pp. 2079–2089. doi: 10.1587/transinf.
2015INP0020.
[3] Benny Applebaum. “Randomized Encoding of Functions”. In: Cryptography in
Constant Parallel Time. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, 2014,
pp. 19–31.
[4] Seiko Arita and Shota Nakasato. “Fully homomorphic encryption for point num-
bers”. In: Information Secruity and Cryptology. Ed. by Kefei Chen, Dongdai Lin,
and Moti Yung. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 253–270.
[5] Avrim Blum, Adam Kalai, and Hal Wasserman. “Noise-tolerant learning, the parity
problem, and the statistical query model”. In: Journal of the ACM (JACM) 50.4
(2003), pp. 506–519.
[6] Dan Boneh, Eu-Jin Goh, and Kobbi Nissim. “Evaluating 2-DNF formulas on
ciphertexts”. In: Theory of Cryptography Conference. Springer. 2005, pp. 325–341.
[7] Dan Boneh et al. “Private Database Queries Using Somewhat Homomorphic Encryp-




[8] Charlotte Bonte et al. Faster Homomorphic Function Evaluation using Non-Integral
Base Encoding. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/333. https://eprint.
iacr.org/2017/333. 2017.
[9] Joppe W Bos, Kristin Lauter, and Michael Naehrig. “Private predictive analysis on
encrypted medical data”. In: Journal of biomedical informatics 50 (2014), pp. 234–
243.
[10] Joppe W Bos et al. “Improved security for a ring-based fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme”. In: Cryptography and Coding. Ed. by Martijn Stam. Berlin, Heidel-
berg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 45–64.
[11] Joppe W Bos et al. “Privacy-friendly Forecasting for the Smart Grid using Homo-
morphic Encryption and the Group Method of Data Handling”. In: Progress in
Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2017. Ed. by Marc Joye and Abderrahmane Nitaj.
Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017, pp. 184–201.
[12] Zvika Brakerski. “Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Modulus Switching
from Classical GapSVP”. In: CRYPTO. Ed. by Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Ran
Canetti. Vol. 7417. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2012, pp. 868–
886. isbn: 978-3-642-32008-8.
[13] Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. “Fully Homomorphic
Encryption without Bootstrapping”. In: Innovations in Theoretical Computer Sci-
ence (ITCS’12). Available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/277. 2012.
[14] Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. “(Leveled) Fully Homo-
morphic Encryption without Bootstrapping”. In: ACM Transactions on Computa-
tion Theory 6.3 (2014), p. 13. doi: 10.1145/2633600.
[15] Zvika Brakerski and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. “Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion from (Standard) LWE”. In: 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Founda-
tions of Computer Science. IEEE. 2011, pp. 97–106.
[16] Zvika Brakerski and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. “Fully homomorphic encryption from
ring-LWE and security for key dependent messages”. In: Annual cryptology con-
ference. Springer. 2011, pp. 505–524.
Bibliography 124
[17] David L Chaum. “Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms”.
In: Communications of the ACM 24.2 (1981), pp. 84–90.
[18] Hao Chen, Kim Laine, and Rachel Player. “Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library
- SEAL v2.1”. In: Financial Cryptography Workshops. Vol. 10323. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. Springer, 2017, pp. 3–18.
[19] Hao Chen et al. High-Precision Arithmetic in Homomorphic Encryption. Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, Report 2017/809. https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/809.
2017.
[20] Jingwei Chen et al. “Faster Binary Arithmetic Operations on Encrypted Integers”.
In: WCSE’17, Proceedings of 2017 the 7th International Workshop on Computer
Science and Engineering. 2017. isbn: 978-981-11-3671-9.
[21] Jung Hee Cheon, Miran Kim, and Myungsun Kim. “Search-and-compute on encrypted
data”. In: International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
Springer, 2015, pp. 142–159.
[22] Jung Hee Cheon et al. “Homomorphic Encryption for Arithmetic of Approximate
Numbers”. In: ASIACRYPT (1). Vol. 10624. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer, 2017, pp. 409–437.
[23] Jung Hee Cheon et al. “Privacy-preserving computations of predictive medical
models with minimax approximation and non-adjacent form”. In: Financial Cryp-
tography and Data Security. Ed. by Michael Brenner et al. Cham: Springer Inter-
national Publishing, 2017, pp. 53–74.
[24] Ilaria Chillotti et al. “Faster Packed Homomorphic Operations and Efficient Circuit
Bootstrapping for TFHE”. In: ASIACRYPT (1). Vol. 10624. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Springer, 2017, pp. 377–408.
[25] Chongwon Cho et al. “Laconic oblivious transfer and its applications”. In: Annual
International Cryptology Conference. Springer. 2017, pp. 33–65.
[26] Benny Chor et al. “Private information retrieval”. In: Proceedings of IEEE 36th
Annual Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE. 1995, pp. 41–50.
Bibliography 125
[27] HeeWon Chung and Myungsun Kim. Encoding of Rational Numbers and Their
Homomorphic Computations for FHE-based Applications. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2016/344. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/344. 2016.
[28] Ian Clarke et al. “Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage and
retrieval system”. In: Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Springer. 2001,
pp. 46–66.
[29] Anamaria Costache et al. “Fixed-Point Arithmetic in SHE Schemes”. In: SAC.
Vol. 10532. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2016, pp. 401–422.
[30] Ronald Cramer, Rosario Gennaro, and Berry Schoenmakers. “A secure and opti-
mally efficient multi-authority election scheme”. In: European transactions on Telecom-
munications 8.5 (1997), pp. 481–490.
[31] Jack L.H. Crawford et al. Doing Real Work with FHE: The Case of Logistic Regres-
sion. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/202. https://eprint.iacr.org/
2018/202. 2018.
[32] Marten van Dijk et al. “Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers”. In:
Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT’10. Vol. 6110. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science. Springer, 2010, pp. 24–43. isbn: 978-3-642-13189-9.
[33] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson. Tor: The second-generation
onion router. Tech. rep. DTIC Document, 2004.
[34] Changyu Dong and Liqun Chen. “A fast single server private information retrieval
protocol with low communication cost”. In: European Symposium on Research in
Computer Security. Springer. 2014, pp. 380–399.
[35] Nathan Dowlin et al. “Manual for using homomorphic encryption for bioinformat-
ics”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE 105.3 (2017), pp. 552–567.
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